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May Regulated Utilities Monopolize The Sun?
JAN

G. LAITOS* and
I.

RANDALL

J.

FEUERSTEIN**

INTRODUCTION

Increased interest in alternative energy forms was stimulated by concern over the steady depletion of nonrenewable
energy resources such as natural gas, oil, and coal. Solar energy, as a supplement to the nation's energy supply, is a feasible alternative energy source when one considers the increasing
costs of fossil fuels, the environmental problems associated
with high-sulfur coal, and the safety and environmental impacts of nuclear energy. The use of solar energy is also consistent with this nation's interest in resource conservation and
eventual energy independence. Solar energy is available everywhere, essentially inexhaustible, environmentally clean, and'
capable of reducing fossil fuel consumption.'
Approximately 25% of the national total energy consumption consists of space heating, water heaqting, and air conditioning.' Decentralized or onsite solar technologies (those designed
to be located on or near the buildings to which heat or electricity is provided) have the greatest potential in serving residential and commercial heating and cooling demands. :' Large* B.A., 1968, Yale University; J.D., 1971, University of Colorado; S.J.D., 1975,
University of Wisconsin. Jan Laitos is an assistant professor of law at the University
of Denver Law School and a consultant to the Solar Energy Research Institute.
** B.S. E.E., 1975, University of Colorado. Randall J. Feuerstein is a second-year
student at the University of Denver Law School and in 1978 was a summer law intern
at the Solar Energy Research Institute.
1. See R.G. JONES, H.M. SRAMEK, & J.M. PELSTER, ANALYSIS OF STATE SOLAR
ENERGY POLICY OPTIONS 3-4 (June 1976) (prepared by the Energy Policy Project of the
National Conference of State Legislatures for the Federal Energy Administration, FEA
Contract No. CO-12-60496-00) [hereinafter cited as SOLAR POLICY OPTIONSl. This
report contains analyses of solar market economics, tax incentives, the relationship
between solar energy and electric utilities, and the implications for state policies.
2. See id. at 3; 1 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECH. TO
TODAY'S ENERGY NEEDS 19 (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as OTA REP.]. Residential
and commercial energy uses, i.e., hot water, space heating, air conditioning, electricity
for lighting and other miscellaneous uses, and gas for cooking, accounted for approximately 36% of the total U.S. energy demand in 1975. Transportation accounted for 26%
with the remaining 38% demanded by the industrial sector. Id.
3. See H. RAu, SOLAR ENERGY 59 (1964); OTA REP., supra note 2, at 18. It has been
claimed that (1) onsite solar hot water systems are economically competitive with
electric hot water systems in most parts of the United States today; (2) onsite solar
space heating is, or soon should be, marginally competitive with heat pump and
electric resistance heating systems in many areas of the United States; (3) decentral-
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scale, centralized generation of electricity by solar technologies
seems promising by the 1990's.1 Both decentralized and centralized applications of solar technologies are discussed below.
A. Onsite Solar Technologies
Onsite solar technologies generally include both passive
solar energy systems and active solar systems consisting of
solar collectors and solar electric systems. Passive solar energy
systems are the result of skillful architectural designs of buildings and landscaping (1) to maximize the amount of solar
energy incident upon and absorbed by a building during winter
months and (2) to maximize natural convective cooling and
minimize solar heat absorbed during the summer months.'
Passive solar designs for the maximum utilization of solar energy are achieved through orientation of the building, the location of trees, the use of awnings, overhangs, or shutters, optimum window size and location, wall thickness, and the use of
movable insulation.
Active solar energy systems generally consist of (1) a solar
collector exposed directly to the sun that converts sunlight into
a heated fluid or gas, or, in the case of solar cells (photovoltaics), that convert light directly into electricity, (2) an energy
storage system, e.g., a large water tank or underground rock
bed, that stores excess energy for use during periods when direct sunlight is unavailable, and (3) an energy-conversion system that converts a heated fluid or gas into mechanical energy
or electricity.' Solar energy collectors can either be nontracking
or of the type that follows the sun during the day. The costs
for flat plate collectors range between $32 and $145 per square
meter (sq. m.) of surface area. For tracking collectors, costs can
run as high as $1,800 per sq. m. for two axis tracking.7
ized solar space heating and hot water systems may be competitive with oil or gas fired
applications by the mid-1980s; and (4) onsite solar air conditioning devices will apear
economically attractive in the 1980s. See id. at 3-4, 19.
4. See Bradley, Designing and Siting Solar Power Plants, 48 CONSULTING
ENGINEER, March 1977, at 80, 83 (issue no. 3).
5. See OTA REP., supra note 2, at 36.
6. See id. at 36-37. Not all active solar systems make use of an energy storage
system. Fewer yet employ an energy conversion system.
7. See id. at 286-89. One axis tracking collectors move along one axis to track the
sun's movement during the day whereas two axis tracking collectors move independently about two axes to follow the sun. Flat plate collectors can provide temperatures
generally ranging between 570 C and 97 0 C. Where higher temperatures are required
for industrial processes, or to operate heat engines, concentrating or tracking collectors
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During periods when direct solar energy is not available,
solar users can either burn fuel for energy at an onsite facility,
purchase auxiliary energy service from a utility company, or
store energy collected during high solar radiation periods in
onsite storage devices.8 The most common energy storage devices for thermal solar applications are hot water tanks or bins
of heated rocks. Electricity producing solar technologies use
batteries for the storage of electrical energy. Current costs of
low temperature (below 250°F) thermal storage facilities range
from $.50 to $5 per kilowatt-hour (KWH) of capacity of the
storage unit.' Costs rise significantly where it is desired to store
energy in a medium at higher temperatures."'
B. Electricity ProducingSolar Technologies
Compared to onsite solar technologies, solar and wind applications for the large scale generation of electricity are more
likely to find practical application in the long term. Sunlight
can be used directly to generate electricity in two ways: (1) by
heating fluids or gases to operate a heat engine" to turn an
electric generator and (2) by using photovoltaic or solar cells,
i.e., solid-state devices which use the sun's energy to produce
electricity directly. 2 Wind applications for the generation of
electricity make use of the wind's energy through a horizontal
or vertical axis propellor to turn an electric generator.
1. Solar Thermal Power Plants
Solar thermal technologies for the generation of electricity
collect concentrated solar energy and convert it to thermal energy which in turn is transferred to a working fluid. The fluid
is then used to drive a Rankine-cycle turbine or gas turbine
would be required. For an extensive analysis of collector designs, environmental impacts, collector costs, and collector performance, see id. at 243-326.
8. For a detailed feasibility and cost analysis of energy storage technologies including thermal, mechanical, and chemical forms, see id. at 427-503.
9. See id. at 40.
10. The average costs of battery storage for storing electricity in chemical form
range from $63 to $93 per kilowatt-hour. See id. at 470. The prices stated above apply
to lead-acid batteries lasting 500-1000 charge/discharge cycles and capable of storing
5 megawatt-hours of energy with a 10-hour discharge. Automobile type batteries are
unsuitable for power applications since repeated full discharge will result in damage
to the batteries. Industrial traction batteries used in forklifts and similar equipment
have lifetimes of 2000 cycles and are available for $80 per kilowatt hour. Id.
11. For a technical discussion of the costs and performance of a variety of heat
engine devices, see id. at 327-89.
12. See id. at 37.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

that turns a conventional electric generator. Electric power
production by solar thermal applications is thus similar to that
of fossil fuel and nuclear power plants. Two designs of solar
thermal generating systems are being considered (1) the solar
power tower concept and (2) energy collection through distributed receivers. 3 The solar power tower concept features a central boiler or receiver located atop a tower of specified height.
The tower is surrounded by mirrors (heliostats) that track the
sun throughout the day and focus sunlight on the central receiver. The distributed receiver concept uses distributed collector systems and receivers through which the heated working
fluid is piped from each receiver unit to the turbine generator.
This design avoids the cost of a tower but has added costs due
to an extensive network of insulated piping.
A solar thermal power plant of the power tower design with
a capacity of 5 megawatts (MW) 4 has been constructed for the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) at Sandia Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Field evaluation of the
array of 222 heliostats focused upon a 200 ft. tower at Sandia
began in 1978.' 5 DOE's solar thermal program also includes the
construction of a $120 million 10 MW pilot plant in the Mohave
Desert near Barstow, California." The pilot plant is to be built
before 1981 and will require about 100 acres of land to accommodate the heliostats. It is estimated that approximately 2000
heliostats, each with about 40 sq. m. of reflective surface area,
will be utilized to focus sunlight upon a 328-459 foot tower.
DOE's solar thermal program plan envisions solar thermal
demonstration plants ranging in capacity from 50 MW to 100
13. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 80-84;

ELECTRIC

PowER

RESEARCH INSTITTuE,

Spinning a Turbine with Sunlight, 3 EPRI JouRNAL, March 1978, at 14-19 (issue no.
2) [hereinafter cited as EPRI Solar-Thermal]. See generally D. SPENCER, SOLAR ENERGY: A VIEw FROM AN ELECTRIC UTILrry STANDPOINT 13-21 (prepared by the Electric
Power Research Institute for the American Power Conference in Chicago, Ill., April 2123, 1975).
14. A watt is a unit of power equal to one joule per second. A kilowatt (KW) is
1,000 watts and a megawatt represents 1,000,000 watts. One horsepower is equivalent
to 746 watts. Energy can generally be expressed as the product of power and time.
Thus, a 1,000 watt light bulb burning for one hour consumes one kilowatt-hour (KWH)
of energy.
15. The cost of the Sandia test facility was approximately $21 million. See EPRI
Solar-Thermal, supra note 13, at 17.
16. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 81-82; EPRI Solar-Thermal, supra note 13, at
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MW to be operational by 1985. Commercial plants of 100 MW
to 300 MW capacity are expected to be operational after 1985.11
The greatest hindrance to the development of solar thermal electric generating plants is their cost. The federal program goal cost of the heliostat component of a solar thermal
power plant is $70 per sq. m. of mirror surface area. Designs
for the heliostats to be tested at Albuquerque are estimated to
cost between $500 and $750 per sq. m.18 Using the $750 cost
figure, the heliostat array for the 10 MW Barstow plant would
cost $60 million or 50% of the project's total estimated cost.
This figure equals $6000 per Kilowatt (KW) of plant capacity,
only for the heliostats. By comparison, costs of conventional
power plants range between $200 and $1,000 per KW of rated
generating capacity. Liquid metal fast breeder reactor nuclear
power plant costs are expected to be as high as $2,500 per KW, 11
but this figure is still low compared with the costs of a solar
thermal power plant.
2. Photovoltaic Power Plants
Photovoltaic devices, similar to the solar cells used to provide power for spacecraft, convert sunlight directly into electric
energy.20 With the absence of mechanical moving parts, photovoltaic devices can operate reliably and quietly with essentially
no adverse environmental impacts. Photovoltaic devices have
been used as power sources for spacecraft, remote railroad signal stations, microwave repeater stations and agricultural applications (including an irrigation pump and fans for drying
grain).21 A large array of photovoltaic cells would be required
for a central electrical generating power source, but tracking
heliostats could be used to focus sunlight upon the cells and
thereby reduce the area of the arrays. 22 However, the current
17. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 83.
18. See EPRI Solar-Thermal, supra note 13, at 17.
19. See Brancato, New Approaches to Current Problems in Electric Utility Rate
Design, 2 COLUM. J. ENVr'L L. 40, 47-49 (1975).
20. For a general discussion of the operation, costs, and applications of photovoltaic energy conversion systems, see ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, The Sun
on a Semiconductor, 3 EPRI JOURNAL, March 1978, at 20-25 (issue no. 2) [hereinafter
cited as EPRI Solar-Photovoltaics];OTA REP., supra note 2, at 391-426; D. Spencer,
supra note 13, at 21-28.
21. See EPRI Solar-Photovoltaics,supra note 20, at 23.
22. See D. Spencer, supra note 13, at 24.
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market for photovoltaics is essentially confined to decentralized or onsite applications."
From a utility perspective, photovoltaic plants have a high
energy value, 24 but as with solar thermal power plant aplications, photovoltaic costs are very high. Current photovoltaic
costs range from $11,000 per KW to $15,000 per KW of output."
Electricity from currently available photovoltaic systems cost
from $1.50 to $2.00 per KWH, 21 compared with electricity
prices from conventional electric utilities averaging between
$.02 and $.07 per KWH for residential service.
3. Wind Power Plants
Us6 of the wind as a power source is not a new concept.
Windmills were used extensively in Europe for milling grain.
An electric power generating windmill, the Smith-Putnam
machine, was located atop Grandpa's Knob in Vermont and
supplied power to the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation's system intermittently from 1941 through 1945.27 The
Smith-Putnam machine utilized a 175 ft. rotor and had a generating capacity of 1.25 MW. A .1 MW wind turbine generator
has been operational since 1975 at NASA's Plumb Brook Station at Sandusky, Ohio.2 The Plumb Brook machine utilizes a
125 ft. diameter twin-bladed single rotor mounted at the downwind end of a streamlined generator housing. The entire unit
is perched atop a 100 ft. tower and is mounted on bearings so
that it may rotate to face the wind at all times. Power is generated when the velocity of the wind exceeds 8 miles per hour.
The 100 KW rated output is achieved when the wind velocity
reaches 18 miles per hour. A .2 MW machine similar to the
Plumb Brook machine was completed early in 1978 at Clayton,
New Mexico. Two machines identical to the Clayton machine
are under construction at Culebra Island and Block Island and
23. See EPRI Solar-Photovoltaics,supra note 20, at 24-25.
24. See id. at 22, 24.
25. See id. at 21; OTA REP., supra note 2, at 393-94.
26. See OTA REP., supra note 2, at 393. DOE's present goals are to cut photovoltaic costs (1) to $7,000 per peak KW in fiscal year 1979, (2) to between $1,000 and
$2,000 per KW by the end of fiscal year 1982, (3) to $500 per KW by the end of fiscal
year 1986, and (4) to between $100 and $300 per KW by the end of fiscal year 1990.
See id. at 394.
27. See ELECTIc POWER RESEARCH INSTIUTE, The Earth as a Solar Heat Engine,
3 EPRI JOURNAL, March 1978, at 43, 43-44 (issue no. 2).
28. See id. at 44.
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are expected to be operational by the end of 1978.29 Federal
contracts have been let for the construction of larger wind turbine generators having rotor diameters as large as 300 ft. and
with generating capacities as high as 3 MW.
As large scale generation of electricity by wind turbine
generators is still basically in the development stage, capital
costs are high. The capital cost of the .1 MW Plumb Brook
machine was $5,500 per KW of rated capacity.3 It is anticipated that these costs can be reduced through the federal wind
energy program, which has as its goals the development and
commercialization of economically viable wind energy sys3
tems . 1
C. The Relationship Between Solar Energy Development and
Utility Companies
The roles assumed by six institutional actors will have a
significant impact upon the development, economic viability,
and commercialization of both onsite and centralized solar
technologies. These primary actors include (1) investor-owned
and publicly-owned (municipal) utility companies, (2)
federally-owned utility agencies, (3) state public utilities commissions (PUCs), (4) federal and state governments, (5) the
solar industry, and (6) solar consumers.
The extent to which both investor- and publicly-owned
utilities are allowed to enter the solar market and own, lease,
or sell onsite technologies will affect the allocation of costs
between either the utilities or the solar consumers. Manufacturers of solar equipment are concerned that utility policies
could foster only a chosen few of the industry while effectively
eliminating other solar manufacturers from a substantial share
of the market. As onsite solar technologies require conventionally fueled auxiliary systems to assure continuous service during periods of adverse weather, solar users will be concerned
about the rates utilities charge for this backup service. Moreover, since investor- and publicly-owned utilities enjoy a mo29. See id. at 45.
30. See id.
31. The structure of the program encompasses five areas: (1) program development; technology; applications of wind energy; legal, social, and environmental issues;
and wind characteristics, (2) small machines (less than 100 KW capacity), (3) 100 KWscale systems, (4) megawatt-scale systems, and (5) large multiunit systems or "wind
farms." See id.
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nopoly in the energy supply market, competition by solar utilities may be foreclosed.
Federal regulation of the solar industry may govern the
extent to which utilities are allowed to own, lease, or sell onsite
solar devices. While federal power agencies are primarily involved with the wholesale sales of electric energy, it is conceivable that federal agencies could distribute onsite solar devices
or manage solar utilities that compete with existing conventional utilities. Since state public utilities commissions regulate the entry of utilities into the energy supply market as well
as the rates charged for utility services, commission policies
could also affect a utility's ability to market onsite solar devices and a solar utility's ability to compete with existing conventional utilities. A state legislature could statutorily govern
the roles of utilities in solar energy development and commercialization.
Three major issues thus emerge involving the relationship
between solar energy development and utility companies.
There exists the possibility that utility companies will seek to
own, lease, or sell solar devices. It is also possible that a solar
company would seek to enter the energy supply market in competition with existing regulated electric utilities. Third, it is
likely that existing utilities may establish a rate structure that
would penalize decentralized use of solar technologies. This
article will address the first two of these issues.
The article will first consider the legal issues associated
with public utility ownership of decentralized or onsite solar
heating and cooling (SHAC) devices that may be placed on
individual homes, shopping centers, apartment complexes, or
may be used by other small scale consumers of solar power.
Second, it will evaluate the legal issues that may arise should
a solar power company (both privately- and publicly-owned)
compete in providing electric service with existing regulated
electric utilities. Both situations are considered in light of applicable existing and proposed federal and Colorado law.
II.

UTILITY OWNERSHIP OF DECENTRALIZED

SHAC

DEVICES

Although many of the SHAC-related issues also pertain to
utility ownership of non-SHAC devices, the implications of
utility ownership of non-SHAC decentralized solar technologies, e.g., small-scale wind or photovoltaic energy conversion
systems, will not be addressed below. The following legal
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issues confined solely to utility ownership of non-SHAC devices
are therefore not discussed: (1) the rates to be charged for
electric energy generated onsite and sold to customers, (2) in
the case of wind systems, the acquisition of an all direction
wind easement, and (3) the legal control of decentralized generating devices.
To what extent, then, may utility companies, whether
investor- or publicly-owned, own decentralized SHAC devices
and thereby market them on a selling or leasing basis? The two
decentralized non-generating solar technologies that will be
particularly affected by utility ownership policies are solar
thermal space conditioning and solar thermal water heating.
Recall that these two technologies generally utilize both flat
plate collectors to capture solar radiation and a working medium of water or air to store the resulting heat.
A. Utility Interest in the Marketing of Solar Devices
A Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
investigation of solar marketing and market acceptance concluded that: "[u]tility policies . . . have the potential to act
32 Among
as barriers to the market acceptance of solar housing. ,,
the utilities surveyed by HUD were gas and electric companies
that (1) supplied utility service for backup purposes to HUD
solar grant homes, and (2) did not provide auxiliary service to
HUD solar homes but possibly did to other solar buildings.
Over 50% of the second category of the utilities stated that
they were providing either heating, ventilating, or air conditioning service to a solar assisted building.3 3 Approximately one
fourth (24%) of all utilities surveyed expressed an intention to
lease SHAC devices and to the question of whether they would
become involved in the servicing of solar equipment, 27% replied yes. The utilities were further asked if they foresaw some
alternative utility involvement in the form of marketing, providing technical assistance or public relations advice, or monitoring solar homes. A majority of the utilities replied yes (59%)
while only 27% replied no.3 4 Many utilities (45%) also believed
32. 1 DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., WORKING PAPERS ON MARKETING AND
MARKET ACCEPTANCE, ch. 6 at 14 (Spring 1978) (Preliminary Findings and Analysis,
prepared for the Solar Demonstration Program, Division of Energy, Building Technology and Standards, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Dept. of Housing
and Urban Development).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 20.
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there was a greater need for solar energy in their regions,"5 while
40% viewed solar energy as a practical alternative to conven36
tional fossil fuel.
The results of the HUD investigation revealed that many
utilities believed there was a greater need for and likelihood of
solar energy commercialization within their regions. A significant number considered solar energy to be a practical alternative to traditional energy sources, and further suggested that
they may become involved in the leasing of solar devices. Even
more utilities stated that they were likely to become involved
in the servicing of solar equipment, and a majority contemplated at least some form of involvement with residential applications in the development of solar energy. In short, it appears that utilities expect to play a substantial role in the
development and commercialization of solar power.
B. Alternative Utility Ownership Policies
If utilities seek to enter the SHAC market, what policies
should be considered concerning utility ownership of SHAC
devices? The four utility ownership policies most frequently
advanced are: (1) utilities, being classified as regulated monopolies, are given exclusive monopoly franchises to own, sell,
lease, or market SHAC systems, (2) utilities are allowed to
enter the solar market, but without exclusive franchises (i.e.,
they may be regulated in their solar activities and will be in
competition with private solar companies), (3) nonregulated
utility subsidiary companies are allowed to enter the solar market but would face competition from private SHAC system
suppliers, and (4) utilities are prohibited from owning, for lease
3
or sale, SHAC systems located upon a customer's premises.
35. See id. at 18.
36. See id. at 19.
37. See S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, THE PUBLIC UTILITY AND SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS 178-79 (Dec. 31, 1976) (prepared for the
Energy Research and Development Administration-Division of Solar Energy, ERDA

Contract No. E(49-18)-2523) [hereinafter cited as UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACEK. A
variation of the same analysis appears in R. BEZDEK, J. MARGOLIN, T. SPARROW, G.
SPONSLER,

A EZRA, R.

SPONGBERG,

A. MILLER, F. MEEKER, E.

ROSEMAN,

& M. MISCH,

ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACCELERATING COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOLAR HEATING

AND COOLING SYSTEMS 220-22 (Feb. 1978) (prepared by the Behavioral Studies
Group, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington
University, for the Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Conservation and
Solar Applications-Division of Solar Applications, Contract No. EX-76-G-01-2534)
[hereinafter cited as SHAC POLICY OPTIONS]. See also R. Noll, Maintaining Competi-
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These four ownership policies have been implemented in
connection with the operation of other regulated industries."
Prior to the FCC's Carterfone3 decision, telephone companies
had exclusive control over the interconnection devices that
were used in the telephone system-a situation reflected above
in the first policy option. Under this scheme, a customer was
required to purchase the internal interconnection system from
the local telephone company. If this ownership policy applied
to solar, a customer who desired to install a SHAC device,
designed to receive backup energy from a utility company,
would be required to purchase or lease the system from the
utility having exclusive rights to serve that area.
Since Carterfone, the telephone industry has been doing
business under a scheme like the second policy option. Telephone companies are allowed to sell terminal devices, but they
no longer have an exclusive monopoly to do so. Telephone customers have the option of (1) obtaining their telephones and
other terminal devices from the telephone company at a regulated rental price, or (2) purchasing this equipment from an
unregulated competitive supplier. Under a similar scheme, a
solar customer could lease the SHAC system from a utility at
a regulated rental rate, or, at his option, purchase the system
from an unregulated supplier.
Policy option three is found when regulated gas and electric utilities control unregulated subsidiary companies that
engage in such activities as mining, energy resource exploration, and the selling of appliances. If this third policy option
tion in Solar Energy Technology in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE SOLAR MARKET:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 179, 181
(June 1978) (presented at the Dec. 15-16, 1977 Solar Energy Symposium sponsored by
the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition).
38. See R. Noll, supra note 37, at 182; SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at
222-24; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 180-81.
39. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). In this case, the telephone companies sought to apply penalties
contained in a tariff to customers who used the Carterfone interconnection device.
According to the tariff, use of such equipment conferred a right upon the telephone
company to remove or disconnect the device or to suspend or terminate service. Id. at
427 (app. A). The FCC agreed with and adopted the examiner's findings that the
Carterfone filled a need and did not adversely affect the telephone system. It was held
that "application of the tariff to bar the Carterfone in the future would be unreasonable and unduly discriminatory." Id. at 423. The FCC further concluded that "the tariff
has been unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful in the past, and that the provisions prohibiting the use of customer-provided interconnecting devices should accordingly be stricken." Id.
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were applied to the solar industry, an unregulated utility subsidiary would be in competition with other solar suppliers in
the marketing of SHAC devices. The extent of direct utility
involvement with SHAC system marketing through the subsidiary would be governed by the nature of PUC jurisdiction over
the utility."0 This means that, depending upon the scope and
interpretation of a state's public utility law, there may be no
PUC jurisdiction over a utility's marketing of SHAC devices.
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company is
faced with the fourth ownership policy, i.e., prohibition from
engaging in a certain business activity. AT&T is prohibited
from engaging in unregulated business, except to a limited degree, in the sale of certain communications equipment. Following a 1956 consent decree that settled an antitrust complaint
against the Bell System," AT&T cannot enter businesses such
as data processing. For example, computer time sharing services that utilize telephone lines for connecting remote data
terminals to central computers can be offered by telephone
utilities not affiliated with the Bell System, but cannot be
offered by Bell affiliates. Under a similar policy, the solar industry would not be faced with competition from utilities or
their unregulated subsidiaries.
1. Regulated Utility Ownership of SHAC Devices
The legal issues associated with utility ownership of SHAC
systems located upon a customer's property are evaluated
below under policies representing (1) a regulated monopoly
situation guaranteed the utility within its service area, (2) a
regulated business operation by the utility in competition with
unregulated solar suppliers, and (3) utility involvement only
through unregulated subsidiary companies of the utility. This
discussion is followed by arguments for and against such utility
participation and involvement in the solar market.
40. The text accompanying notes 42-55 infra addresses whether a utility in Colorado that is somehow involved in the ownership of SHAC devices located upon a
customer's premises would be subject to PUC regulation of such activity.
41. United States v. Western Electric Co., [1956] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,
246. According to the decree, AT&T is enjoined from engaging in the manufacture of
any equipment of a type not sold or leased to companies of the Bell System for use in
furnishing common carrier communications service, except equipment used in the
manufacture or installation of equipment of a type so sold. The decree also provides
that AT&T is enjoined from engaging in any business other than the furnishing of
common carrier communications services. Id.
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a. Regulation by Public Utilities Law
In Colorado, the Public Utilities Law 2 provides for public
utility commission (PUC) regulation controlling (1) entry into
the public service market, (2) the rates and charges for utility
services, and (3) the standards and conditions of service. In
addition, a Colorado constitutional provision vests all power to
regulate the facilities, service, rates, and charges of every corporation, individual, or association operating within the state
as a public utility in the PUC.13 "Public Utility" is statutorily
defined to include every gas corporation, electrical corporation,
person, or municipality operating for the purpose of supplying
the public for domestic, mechanical, or public uses and every
corporation or person declared by law to be affected with a
public interest." The statute further provides that such public
utilities are subject to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation
5
of the PUC and to the provisions of the Public Utilities Law.1
Under the statutory definition, an investor-owned electric
or gas utility is subject to the PUC regulation in accordance
with the Public Utilities Law. However, the state's jurisdictional provisions provide little indication as to whether a regulated utility supplying SHAC devices would be subject to such
regulation. An argument could be made that a utility company, in supplying SHAC devices to the public, is engaging in
an activity affected with a public interest and therefore subject
to the general jurisdiction of the PUC. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, in Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, has held that any business or activity
that is affected with a public interest may be regulated under
the police power of the state."6 Should utility ownership of
SHAC devices be declared to be "affected with a public interest," then such activity would be subject to the general jurisdiction of the PUC.
What legal significance attaches to utility status and PUC
jurisdiction thereover? In order for a utility to enjoy monopoly
status in the ownership of SHAC devices consistent with policy
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-101 to 111 (1973).
43. COLO. CONST. art. XXV.
44. CoO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-103(1).
45. Id.
46. 159 Colo. 262, 279, 411 P.2d 785, 794, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).
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one, PUC control of entry into the business of supplying SHAC
systems would be required. Before a utility begins the construction of a new facility, plant, system or an extension thereto, it
must first obtain from the PUC a certificate that the present
or future public convenience and necessity will require such
construction. 7 The installation of SHAC devices upon a customer's premises could be considered the construction of a new
system or a new extension to the utility's existing system. If so,
a means exists for conferring monopoly status upon a utility for
its activity in supplying the public with SHAC devices as it has
been held by the Colorado Supreme Court that the purpose of
the certification process is to avoid duplication of facilities and
competition between utilities.48 The certification process would
be absent under policy two as competition from other regulated
entities as well as unregulated solar manufacturers is allowed
under that policy.
The Public Utilities Law requires that all charges demanded or received by any public utility for any product or
commodity furnished, or any service rendered, shall be just and
reasonable. The law further provides that every unjust or unreasonable charge is prohibited."9 The rental rates charged by
a utility for the leasing of SHAC devices would be subject to
the statutory "reasonableness" test as administered by the
PUC. Rate regulation would therefore be applicable under the
first and second policy options.5
Adequacy of solar service would seem to be governed by a
Colorado statute requiring every public utility to provide adequate, just, and reasonable service as will promote the safety,
health, and convenience of its patrons." All utilities leasing
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-5-101.
48. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 273, 411 P.2d
785, 791, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S.

984 (1966).
49. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-3-101(1).
50. For a detailed presentation of public utility rate regulation as one aspect of
the regulatory process, see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTnILT RATEs 147-283
(1961); P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTtrIry ECONOMics 27-189 (1964); 1 A.
PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 45-226 (1969). See also Huntington,

The Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility
Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REV. 689, 698-718 (1975); R. Feuerstein, Utility Rates and
Service Policies as Potential Barriers to the Market Penetration of Decentralized Solar
Technologies (1978) (unpublished paper, prepared for the Solar Energy Research Institute, on file with the authors).
51. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-3-101(2).
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solar devices to customers would have to abide by the principle
that serving some but not all customers within a utility's service area constitutes a practice that is discriminatory and illegal. 52 In an analogous case the Colorado PUC held that a water
utility's actions in providing service to some but not all patrons
located in the area covered by its certificate not only constitutes prejudice and discrimination, 53 but also that the issuance
of a certificate by the commission and its acceptance by a
utility obligates it to furnish service to all the inhabitants of the
territory covered by the certificate. 4 Any utility that receives
a certificate to supply SHAC devices within its service area is
therefore under an obligation to provide solar service to those
customers who make such a demand.
With respect to adequacy of service, the Colorado PUC has
held that a public utility is under a duty to provide reasonably
satisfactory and efficient service, and that it cannot perform
negligently, carelessly, inefficiently, or in any other unsatisfactory manner. 5 Thus, any solar service furnished by a utility
under the first or second policy options would be subject to the
adequacy and efficiency standards of service.
Another matter needing consideration should a utility provide SHAC devices under policies one and two is whether the
equipment used to provide solar service can be included in the
rate base. The rate base of a utility is generally defined as the
actual legitimate cost of plant and equipment used in providing the public service, with reasonable allowances for working
capital less accumulated depreciation. 6 The amount of revenue utilities are allowed to recover from the rates they charge
is proportional to the rate base. Therefore, it would be imperative that utility-owned solar devices be included into the rate
base in order for the utility to provide solar service. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in an early case dealing with the issue
52. See LaBate v. North Fed. Water Sys., 62 P.U.R. (n.s.) 92, 102 (Colo. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1945).
53. In re LaBate, 64 P.U.R. (n.s.) 411, 413 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1946).
54. Id.
55. Farmers Elec. & Power Co. v. Town of Ault, P.U.R. 1920 D, 214, 225 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1920).
56. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 50, at 159-237; P. GARFIELD & W.
Lov joy, supra note 50, at 56-83; 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 50, at 139-90.
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of property included in the rate base, held that the test is
whether such property is used and useful in supplying the service that the utility has undertaken to furnish. 7 Under this principle, it seems likely that a utility's investment in SHAC devices would be included in the rate base as being property
useful in providing solar service.
If Colorado were to adopt the third policy option, it would
appear from a review of Colorado's Public Utilities Law that
the PUC would have no direct regulatory authority over a utility's wholly owned subsidiary. The extent of the regulation, if
any, would appear to be indirect. For example, in People's
Natural Gas Division of Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, a recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, it was held that the PUC has authority to include
only that portion of the capital structure of a diversified entity
that (1) accurately reflects the actual capitalization of the utility operation or (2) finances the rate base thereof in the calculation of rates.5 8 The court concluded that the PUC had authority
to pierce the corporate structures of corporations that operate
utility divisions to separate the utility capital structure from
that of nonutility operations and subsidiaries of the corporation. 9 Under this principle, the investment associated with
ownership of SHAC devices by a utility subsidiary could not
be imputed to the utility as part of its rate base. Utility operations and the regulation thereof would be totally separate from
the subsidiary's activities to the extent that the utility's customers would not be financing the solar operation. Such a conclusion would be favorable to nonsolar utility customers under
policy option three who might otherwise be faced with the possibility of subsidizing a utility subsidiary's solar operations.
Two other issues should be mentioned that are relevant to
SHAC system ownership by utilities that involve PUC regulation. First, since SHAC systems are not perfect substitutes for
conventional heating and air conditioning systems, a solar user
requires a certain amount of auxiliary energy. It is likely that
this demand for conventional service from an electric or gas
utility for backup purposes will occur during periods of extended cloudy weather or extreme cold conditions. The rele57.
55 P.2d
58.
59.

Glenwood Light and Water Co. v. City of Glenwood Springs, 98 Colo. 340, 343,
1339, 1340 (1936).
567 P.2d 377, 380 (1977).
Id. at 380-81.
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vant issue, which is beyond the scope of this article, is whether
a utility may charge different than traditional rates for service
provided to solar users for backup purposes. In other words,
may a utility discriminate for or against solar users in its ratemaking practices? 0
In addition, it is important to note that the optimum balance of regulation and competition shifts with time and can
affect the market penetration rate of solar devices. Where regulation tends to be overly conservative, it can supplant rather
than supplement free competition." As an example, cable television grew rapidly from about 1950 to the early 1960s as an
unregulated industry. After the early 1960s, the FCC assumed
regulatory jurisdiction and stunted the industry's growth for
the four-year period from 1968 to 1972. The period was characterized by intense political bargaining between the industry,
broadcasters, and other parties where the government acted as
an arbitrator. Such bargaining resulted in a retardation of the
growth of the new technology both during the four-year period
and thereafter. 2 A similar result is possible should SHAC system marketing be overly regulated, either by PUCs or the federal government.
b. Arguments Against Utility Ownership of Decentralized SHAC Devices
A common argument of those opposed to utility ownership
of SHAC devices is that through unfair competition utilities
may foreclose other solar manufacturers from the market."s It
60. This issue and others pertaining to utility rate and service policies toward
solar users are given extensive treatment in R. Feuerstein, supra note 50.
61. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1
(1971).
62. The cable television discussion was adapted from H. Peterson, Resource Allocation Under Alternative Regulatory Scenarios (Sept. 21, 1976) (Utah State University, unpublished paper, on file with the authors). The paper presents a microeconomic
and mathematical analysis of various situations that may occur in the development
of the solar industry. The three regulatory and organizational arrangements considered
are: (1) no regulation of solar or conventional energy supplies, (2) regulated monopoly
providing both solar and conventional energy, and (3) regulated monopoly providing
conventional energy and an unregulated industry providing solar.
63. See K. Bossong, The Case Against Private Utility Involvement in
Solar/Insulation Programs, SOLAR AGE, January 1978 at 23, 24; GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING COMMERCIALIZATION WORKSHOP 14, 22 (May 1977) (hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGSI; A. HIRSCHBERG, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES WORKSHOP: SUMMARY PAPER 12 (April 20, 1978) (pre-

pared for the Department of Energy's Solar Energy/Utility Conference held on March
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is possible that this result could occur by three means. First,
[riegulated utilities can use solar technology strategically as a
means to create internal subsidies within their price structures
and, thereby, to recapture some of the monopoly profits that
regulation takes away as well as to foreclose competition in the
solar energy business. For example, a joint solar/gas utility would
have to work out a method of allocating its costs between solarassisted and gas-only services. If it could effect an allocation that,
in fact, attributed too much cost to gas, it would succeed in
taking advantage of its monopoly in the gas business to subsidize
its solar energy business."

Such subsidization could occur when conventional utility operations contribute to the utility's or the subsidiary's solar activities. A strict regulatory policy by PUCs would be required to
prevent the utility's conventional service ratepayers from lowering solar costs for the solar operation. One effect of this subsidization would be lower costs of SHAC devices, which in turn
would result in a utility or subsidiary being able to charge lower
than market prices for its SHAC systems. Such a price differential could potentially force unregulated solar competitors
from the market.
A second means by which unregulated solar suppliers
could be foreclosed from the solar market is where utilities or
their subsidiaries do not themselves manufacture SHAC devices, but instead give "just a few companies the lion's share
of the business, [through their purchasing policies] rather
than spreading around their purchases . . . . [Such a policy
would allow utilities to] effectively decide which solar companies will be allowed to continue in business. 6 5 Those unregulated companies not enjoying the business from utility purchases would likely be forced to discontinue operations.
Utilities may also find it economic to acquire the solar
manufacturing company rather than to continue purchasing
28-29, 1978, at George Washington University); SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37,
at 225-26; G. SWETNAM, F. ELDRIDGE, & D. JARDINE, ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES STUDY OF
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SOLAR AND WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS AND ELECrRIC UTILITIES 82

(March 31, 1977) (prepared by the Mitre Corp. for the Federal Energy Administration,
Office of Synfuels, Solar, and Geothermal Energy, Contract No. P05-77-4242-0)
[hereinafter cited as ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES]; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra
note 37, at 183-84.
64. R. Noll, supra note 37, at 184.
65. K. Bossong, supra note 63, at 24. See also A. HIRSCHBERG, supra note 63, at
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SHAC devices from it. Utilities would thus become vertically
integrated in much the same way as the nation's large oil companies are. Such practices suppress competition, allow price
maneuvering within the different levels of the industry and
chill innovative research and development.
It has been argued that since utility profits are proportional to the value of property included in the rate base, utilities have a tendency to overcapitalize, i.e., to invest in overly
durable equipment so as to increase the value of the rate base."6
Overcapitalization under regulation for the purpose of expanding the rate base and hence utility profits is known as the
Averch-Johnson, and Wellisz (A-J-W) effect." If the first and
second policy options were implemented, the A-J-W effect
could lead to utilities investing in solar technology that was
excessively efficient in converting sunlight to heating or cooling
energy, and that required inefficiently little maintenance. If
PUCs allowed such "gold plating" of the rate base from utilityowned SHAC devices, excessive solar costs and prices, as well
as a possible slowdown in the adoption of innovative SHAC
technologies, might result.
There also seems to be a lack of evidence that utility ownership of SHAC devices is justified under a natural monopoly
theory. 8 The natural monopoly concept arises from the theory
that it is better to have a fewer utilities providing a certain
service within a given area than to allow any number of entities
to compete for business under a competitive market structure."
Natural monopolies are recognized and legitimated in special
cases since the unit cost of providing service is lower under a
regulated monopoly than under competition. This fact arises
because of (1) the elimination of costly duplication of facilities, (2) decreasing average unit costs as output increases, and
(3) economies of scale resulting from the purchases of large
66. See A. HIRSCHBERG, supra note 63, at 15; R. Noll, supra note 37, at 183; SHAC
supra note 37, at 224-25; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37,
at 182-83.
67. See H. Averch & L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
POLICY OPTIONS,

Constraint,52 AMER. ECON. REV. 105 (Dec. 1962).
68. See R. Noll, supra note 37, at 183; SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at
224; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 181-82.
69. In re Application of the Long Acre Elec. Light & Power Co., 1 P.S.C.R. 226,
249-50 (1st Dist. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comrn'n 1908). See also J. BONBRIGrr, supra note
50, at 10-13; P. GARFIELD & W. Lovgjoy, supra note 50, at 15-19; 1 A. PRIEST, supra
note 50, at 361-65. But see id. at 321-24.
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quantities. Utility ownership of individual self-contained
SHAC devices does not exhibit the same economies of scale as
those present in utility ownership of a large electric power
plant.
It has been contended that utilities, which are generally
state regulated, are not really accountable to the public.70 Customers of the utility are essentially a captive market with no
choices since a particular service within a given area is generally provided by only one company. Should policy one be implemented, the resultant lack of competition could lead to slow
development of advanced technologies and provide no incentive to the utilities to be responsive to the wishes of the public.
The main existing means of accountability, PUC proceedings,
are costly and time consuming. Lack of accountability by a
utility to its solar customers might therefore prove detrimental
to rapid solar development.
Finally, a significant policy argument against utility ownership of SHAC devices is that utilities should not be given the
authority to "own the sun" by owning and marketing SHAC
devices. 7' Such control would seemingly allow too much discretion in utilities as to the rate of solar commercialization and
the development of more innovative technologies. If utilities or
their subsidiaries were to vary the rate of solar commercialization based on its profit yeilding characteristics, the use of
solar energy could invariably be slowed while more emphasis
was being placed on conventional energy supply.
c. Arguments for Utility Ownership of Decentralized SHAC Devices
Utility advocates list several advantages of utility participation in the marketing of SHAC devices.
First, although solar energy utilities the "free" energy from the
sun, it requires additional first or capital cost. Since the construction industry is highly "first-cost intensive," we expect
that solar energy will have some difficulty finding early, rapid
acceptance. A utility company is used to high first-cost (capital
intensive) business ventures. Utility company sponsorship in the
"lease to the user" mode will do a lot to reduce this barrier . ...
70. See K. Bossong, supra note 63, at 25.
71. See id. at 26. See also Utilities and Solar Energy: Will They Own the Sun?,
PEOPLE & ENERGY, Oct. 1976, at 2; Northcross, Who Will Own the Sun?, THE
PROGRESSIVE, April 1976, at 14-16.
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Second, the sponsorship of a utility company may help to
overcome market "fragmentation." If the utility company buys
the equipment and leases it in a large-scale fashion, the solar
industry will face at least one aggregated market (to the gas
company). This may provide a large enough incentive to actively
stimulate a solar energy system fabrication industry.
Third, because a utility company already has a
sales/distribution/service network which operates within the
housing industry, the Utility Company scenario provides a way
of "product fitting" solar energy systems.
Finally, because of the traditional anti-innovation bias
within the industry (a bias which is quite understandable given
the industry environment), utility company sponsorship will help
overcome some of the traditional "institutional-cultural biases"
against solar energy which exist within the housing industry."

In addition, since SHAC devices have the potential to adversely affect electric utility system load factors,7" utility ownership might insure that the devices are designed to be used
as an effective load management tool, i.e., designed to mini72. Dean & Miller, Utilities at the Dawn of a Solar Age, 53 N.D. L. REV. 329, 35051 (1977) (quoting Hirshberg & Schoen, Barriersto the Widespread Utilizationof Residential Solar Energy: The Prospects for Solar Energy in the U.S. Housing Industry, 5
POL'Y Sci. 453, 468 (1974)). For a variation of the Dean and Miller article see N. Dean
& A. Miller, Plugging Solar Power Into the Utility Grid, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 50069 (1977);
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF

BUILDINGS 86 (March 1978) (prepared for the Department of Energy, Assistant Secre-

tary for Conservation and Solar Applications, Division of Solar Applications, Contract
No. EX-76-C-01-2528); SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 358.
73. See, e.g., H. LORSCH, IMPLICATIONS OF RESIDENTIAL SOLAR SPACE CONDITIONING
ON ELECTRIC UTILIES ch. 1 at 3 (Dec. 1976) (prepared by The Franklin Institute
Research Laboratories for the National Science Foundation, Contract No. NSFC1033(AER-75-18270)). But see S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRICING AND
SOLAR ENERGY DESIGN (Sept. 1976) (prepared for the National Science Foundation,
Grant No. APR-75-18006).
Feldman and Anderson found that SHAC devices, depending on climatic regions,
collector sizing, and the utility's system, do not necessarily adversely affect an electric
utility's load factor and concluded that:

[n]o general statement can be made regarding the impact of SHAC upon
the load curve of the electric utility industry. This analysis must be
performed on an individual utility basis, since variations in the ambient
weather conditions, load curves and generation mixes of utilities will be
the prime determinants in the magnitude of the impact.

Id. at 117.
Load factor is a measure of an electric utility's average use of its capacity as a
percentage of the maximum capacity, or the ratio of average power to peak power for
a given period. Utilities strive to operate at high load factors to achieve the optimum
and most efficient use of facilities for a given generating capacity, thereby improving
profits and ensuring relative reductions in electricity price. SOLAR POLICY OPIONS,
supra note 1, ch. IV, at 4.
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mize any adverse impact upon the system load factor. 74 For
example, SHAC designs that are currently potentially beneficial to the utility's system load factor use auxiliary energy only
during offpeak periods. Such systems may also be capable of
recharging their storage devices by offpeak auxiliary energy to
be used during periods of adverse weather. Under utility ownership, the SHAC devices could be controlled by the utility to
assure that auxiliary demand did not occur coincidentally with
the system's peak.
Utility ownership and leasing is also "an option which can
potentially bring solar energy to the public at attractive cost
levels, with the solar system cost incorporated in a monthly
utility bill. Utilities could potentially derive substantial economic benefits from controlling the utilization patterns of solar
systems."7 5 In other words, utility ownership is a means of circumventing the barrier of high first cost through utility purchasing in a climate attendant to the energy business. Moreover, utilities have existing service, maintenance, and administrative operations (e.g., billing procedures which could easily
be adapted to include the providing of solar service) that might
easily be adaptable to a solar leasing scheme.
Utility ownership of solar devices might even help assure
solar users of product quality. 6 Utilities, having technical competence and expertise, could insure that the product leased to
a consumer not possessing such knowledge meets certain reliability, safety, and performance criteria. Utility ownership,
however, is only one solution to the product quality problem.
The imposition of federal and/or state quality standards could
instead solve the product quality problem. Solar warranties, be
they state- or industry-initiated, may offer another solution to
quality control.
Contrary to one of the arguments advanced against utility
ownership of SHAC devices, utilities can seemingly achieve
74. See SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 227-28; UTILrY AND SOLAR INTERsupra note 37, at 186.
75. BOoz-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVES AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL, ch. I at 6 (March 1976) (prepared for the Federal
Energy Administration, Office of Synfuels, Solar and Geothermal Energy, Contract
No. CO-05-50272-00).
76. See SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 228-29; UTILrrY AND SOLAR INTERFACE., supra note 37, at 187-88. See also PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 21.
FACE,
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economies of scale in providing solar service to the public.17 It
is possible that economies of scale can be realized through (1)
large-volume purchases of the equipment and (2) designs incorporating the use of centralized collector and storage systems.
Under the latter configuration a number of individual homes
or apartments would receive heat or air conditioning from one
collector/storage facility.
A final argument for utility ownership of SHAC systems
takes into account the nature of the energy supply business and
its policies of operation. It has been stated that utilities are the
only organizations at present that face the proper incentives for
optimizing the choice among energy alternatives. Since most
consumers are not charged the marginal costs of providing conventional energy service, they are not faced with sufficient incentives to change to solar energy. Utilities can better weigh all
factors contributing to the costs of various conventional and
so as to reach the most economic alloauxiliary energy sources
78
resources.
of
cation
2. Federal and State Limitations on Utility Ownership of
SHAC Devices
a. Utility and Utility Subsidiary Ownership of
SHAC Devices and the FederalAntitrust Laws
Any discriminatory practice against either a solar user or
the solar industry by utilities or subsidiaries having substantial
control of solar development through their ownership policies
may give rise to an action based on the antitrust laws.79 The
earliest and most authoritative antitrust statute is the Sherman Act of 1890,80 of which section two prohibits monopolization or attempts by persons or corporations to monopolize.
77. See ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES, supra note 63, at 81.
78. See SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 229; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 188. See also ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES, supra note 63, at 81;
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 21-22.
79. See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 336-37. See also D. Zillman, Solar
Energy, Public Utilities,and the Competitive Economy, THE SOLAR MARKET: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 214, 217-22
(June 1978) (presented at the Dec. 15-16, 1977, Solar Energy Symposium sponsored
by the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition). For a more in depth
discussion of federal antitrust laws and their impact on solar energy commercialization, see J. Gross, Impact of the Antitrust Laws on the Commercialization of Solar
Energy (1978) (unpublished paper, prepared for the Solar Energy Research Institute,
on file with the authors).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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Over the years, however, a huge body of antitrust law has
grown through an accumulation of statutes, regulations, case
law decisions, and policies28
Of particular relevance to solar power and utilities is Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 2 where the Supreme Court
ruled upon a section two13 monopoly charge against an electric
utility. Otter Tail, a major investor-owned electric utility, refused to sell wholesale power and declined to wheel power from
another source to small communities seeking to establish municipal electric distribution systems. Otter Tail contended that
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulation of wholesale
sales, wheeling, and interconnection shielded them from application of the antitrust laws and therefore barred antitrust action. The Supreme Court held that Otter Tail, by reason of its
regulation by the FPC, was not immune to application of antitrust regulation as the Federal Power Act does not exempt
electric utilities from the antitrust laws."' Of more importance
is the Court's holding that the actions of Otter Tail in refusing
to sell at wholesale to or to wheel power for the municipalities
constituted anticompetitive and monopolistic practices in violation of section two of the Sherman Act."' After Otter Tail, a
utility company's refusal under the first policy option to lease
SHAC devices to certain consumers, or to purchase SHAC devices from certain solar manufacturers, (grounded on a desire
to protect its monopoly position) may be deemed anticompetitive and in violation of the Sherman Act. Utilities operating
under the first and second policy options, by virtue of their
81. Many treatises are available that provide helpful discussions of the antitrust
laws. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1975); R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
(1974). The basic antitrust statutes begin at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
82. 410 U.S. 366, rehearingdenied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973).
83. Section two of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.

15 U.S.C. § 2.
84. 410 U.S. at 372-75.
85. Id. at 377-79.
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regulation, would not be immune from application of the antitrust laws. Moreover, under the second and third policy options, the acquisition of a competitor that has the effect of
substantially lessening competition in the sale or purchase of
SHAC devices may violate the antitrust laws."
Another decision of relevance to solar energy and utilities
is Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 7 where the Supreme Court
examined the relation between state regulatory authority and
the antitrust laws. For severalyears, Detroit Edison followed a
policy of supplying free light bulbs to its residential customers-a marketing practice approved as part of its rate structure
by the Michigan Public Service Commission. A retail druggist
and seller of light bulbs challenged the practice by arguing that
Edison used its monopoly status to restrain competition in the
sale of light bulbs in violation of the Sherman Act. Edison
maintained that the state action exemption to application of
the antitrust laws applied and was triggered by the state commission's approval of the marketing practice. The lower federal
courts held, on the authority of Parker v. Brown,"' that the
commission's approval of the practice constituted state action
and exempted the practice from federal antitrust laws." The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that "state authorization,
approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive conduct confers no antitrust immunity."911 The Court concluded
that "neither Michigan's approval of the tariff filed by respondent, nor the fact that the lamp-exchange program may not be
terminated until a new tariff is filed, is a sufficient basis for
implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for that
program." 9 ' After Cantor, a commission-approved utility practice regarding solar ownership under the first or second policy
options would not exempt the practice from the antitrust laws.
The state action exemption as applied to municipallyowned utilities was recently considered by the Supreme Court
86. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,175-84 (1911).
87. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
88. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
89. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 513
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1976) (affirmed without published opinion), rev'd, 428 U.S. 579
(1976).
90. 428 U.S. at 592-93.
91. Id. at 598.
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in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. "' Cities
owning municipal electric utilities brought an action against a
privately-owned utility (LP&L) on the basis of violation of federal antitrust laws, and LP&L counterclaimed on the same
basis. The case involved claims by the cities that LP&L had
conspired to restrain trade and attempted to monopolize by
preventing the construction and operation of competing electric systems and by foreclosing supplies from markets served
by the company. In the counterclaim, LP&L alleged that the
cities had conspired to displace LP&L in certain areas by requiring customers thereof to purchase electricity from the cities
as a condition of continued water and gas service.
A decision by the district court dismissing the counterclaim was reversed and remanded by the court of appeals.':'
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals by rejecting an automatic immunity from federal antitrust laws for municipally-owned utilities. The Court concluded that actions of state agencies or subdivisions are exempt
only to the extent that such actions are "engaged in as an act
of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions,
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 9 Under the City of Lafayette
principle, a municipality adopting discriminatory practices in
the purchasing or selling of SHAC devices under the first or
second policy option may be subject to federal antitrust laws.
Only where it appears that a municipality has acted pursuant
to the state's command would the state action exemption
apply.
Another portion of the federal antitrust laws, the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, prohibits price
discrimination in goods of like grade and quantity where the
effect of such conduct is to substantially lessen competition or
to tend to create a monopoly." One case decided by the Su92. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978). The special case of municipal utility ownership of
decentralized SHAC devices is considered in the text accompanying notes 120-34 infra.
93. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978).
94. 98 S.Ct. at 1137.
95. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1976). The Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
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preme Court under the Robinson-Patman Act may be applicable to utilities who own and lease SHAC devices. In Federal
Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., the practice of selling
salt transported in interstate commerce at quantity discounts
constituted a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act when only
9 7
some purchasers were able to take advantage of the discount.
The Court stated that:
[tihe Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer
of such advantages except to the extent that a lower price could
be justified by reason of a seller's diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale, or by reason of the seller's good
faith effort to meet a competitor's equally low price.18

Furthermore, the Court reiterated previous holdings to the effect that harm in fact need not necessarily result to competition; only a reasonable "possibility" of such harm would be
sufficient to base a cause of action." Where a utility or a subsidiary receives quantity discounts in the purchase of SHAC
devices as an instrument of favor from certain solar suppliers,
such a transaction will be a possible violation of the RobinsonPatman Act.
A Clayton Act violation may occur if a utility or a subsidiary enters into an agreement with its SHAC system supplier to
exclusively deal in the supplier's products rather than those of
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for difference in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . .
And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from

selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods
concerned . ...

Id. at § 13(a).
97. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id. at 46.
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a competitor. Under this federal statute, a company may not
sell goods on the condition that the recipient not buy the goods
of a competitor if the effect of such a transaction may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.""' For
example, in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,"" Atlantic had
agreed, in return for a certain commission, to assist Goodyear
in promoting the sales of products to the oil company's retail
service station dealers and wholesale outlets. Noting Atlantic's
economic power in inducing its outlets to buy Goodyear products, the Court found the practice to be anticompetitive under
the Clayton Act and therefore unlawful." 2 A similar result is
likely should utilities prevent buyers of utility-owned SHAC
devices from purchasing such devices from competitors.
b. Utility and Utility Subsidiary Ownership of
SHA C Devices and Colorado Trade Law
The legislative declaration of the Colorado Unfair Practices Act10 3 is "to safeguard the public against the creation or
perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by
which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented."' 14 One significant section of the statute declares that
it is unlawful for any corporation engaged in the sale of any
product or service to discriminate between different locations
by selling the product or service at lower rates in different
100. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities,
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States or any territory thereof or the District of Columbia or
any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon,
such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.
101. 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
102. Id. at 371.
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-101-117 (1973). For a detailed analysis of Colorado
trade regulation laws, see Ducker, Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer, 44 DEN. L.J. 558
(1967).
104. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-102.
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locations.' 05 However, the statute provides an exception for any
service or product sold or furnished by a public utility subject
to regulation by the PUC or by any municipal regulatory
body.'M Where utility ownership of SHAC devices under the
first or second policy option is regulated by the PUC, rental
prices will not be subject to scrutiny under this statute. However, the rental charged by a subsidiary under policy three, as
well as the prices charged by solar manufacturers who supply
SHAC devices to either utilities or subsidiaries, would be subject to scrutiny under the Colorado Act.
The Act would further require that the prices that would
be charged by SHAC device suppliers to utilities or subsidiaries
be no less than the cost to the manufacturer."'" Cost is defined
to be the sum of the cost of raw materials, labor, and all overhead expenses of the producer. 08 The Colorado Supreme Court
has held that where a merchant was selling below cost (as
defined within the statute) with an intent to destroy competition, such a practice was in violation of the statute."'"
Moreover, every agreement or contract intended to prevent competition is an illegal restraint of trade in Colorado.""
Corporations engaging in any combination, conspiracy, or
agreement restraining trade, or combining or conspiring to
monopolize any part of the trade in Colorado are guilty of an
unlawful conspiracy."' Unlike the price discrimination section
discussed above, no exemption from application of these stat105. Id. at § 6-2-103(1).
106. Id. at § 6-2-103(2).
107. Id.at § 6-2-105(1).
108. Id.at § 6-2-105(2).
109. Dikeou v. Food Distributors Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 47-49, 108 P.2d 529, 533-34
(1940).
110. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1976 Cum. Supp.):
Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce is declared illegal. Every combination,
conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement, or contract intended to restrain or
prevent competition in the supply or price of any article or commodity
constituting a subject of trade or commerce in this state, or every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement, or contract which controls in
any manner the price of any such article or commodity, fixes the price
thereof, or limits or fixes the amount or quantity thereof to be manufactured, produced, or sold in this state, or monopolizes or attempts to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in this state, is declared
an illegal restraint of trade.
111. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1973).
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utes is afforded to investor- or municipally-owned public utilities." 2 Therefore, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies between a SHAC system supplier and a utility or subsidiary
would be suspect as being illegal where the effect of such an
arrangement is to restrain trade, to attempt to monopolize, or
to prevent competition from other SHAC system suppliers. '
3. Prohibition of Utility Ownership of SHAC Devices
If the fourth policy option were implemented, utilities and
their subsidiaries would be prohibited from owning decentralized SHAC devices located upon their customer's premises.
Such a prohibition would result in a competitive supply market
consisting of large and small businesses engaged in the manufacture, installation, leasing or sale of SHAC devices. The state
would regulate these businesses the same as it does any other
entities doing business in Colorado.
The creation of this competitive market structure could be
achieved by either of two methods. First, to the extent that the
PUC has jurisdiction over the ownership of SHAC devices by
a utility, the PUC could prohibit such activity in either its rules
and regulations or its general policy positions." ' Before the
PUC could prohibit a utility from owning SHAC devices it
must be shown that such ownership "affects" or "could affect"
the utility's regulated business."' It is likely that this affection
test could be satisfied when one considers (1) the utility's desire
to include the capital cost of SHAC ownership in its rate base,
and (2) the possibility of interservice rate subsidization between the utility's solar service and conventional energy service. In light of these two factors, the PUC would have a legal
basis for prohibiting utility ownership of SHAC devices if it
chose to do so.
A second possible means of preventing utilities from entering the solar market is by state statute. Under a state's police
power to adopt regulations promoting the health, safety, general welfare, and morals of its citizens,"' a state could pass
112.
113.
Fleming
114.

See id. at § 6-4-103.
For a recent federal case interpreting section 101 see Q-T Markets, Inc. v.
Companies, 394 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 1975).
See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 355-56.

115. See id. at 355 (citing G.

TURNER, TRENDS AND

ToPIcs

IN UTILITY REGULATION

20 (1969)).
116. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911). Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said: "the police power extends to all the great public needs [citation
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legislation that either prohibited utility participation in the
ownership of SHAC devices or prescribed the extent to which
a utility or its subsidiary could become involved in the solar
market. Legislation governing the extent of solar participation
by investor-owned utilities or their subsidiaries does not exist
in Colorado. However, precedent exists elsewhere for such a
law. Legislation has been passed in California that requires the
authorization of the PUC in the event that an electric utility,
gas utility, or a subsidiary thereof desires to manufacture,
lease, sell, or otherwise own or control any solar energy sys7
tem."1
The basic disadvantage in completely prohibiting utility
involvement in the ownership of SHAC systems lies in the
possibility that solar designs might not be optimized for utility
load management programs. The greatest concern is that
SHAC devices would not be designed so as to utilize only offpeak auxiliary energy. There is a more remote possibility that
SHAC devices would be of poor quality without some controls
imposed by utilities.
A summary of the implications of utility ownership of
SHAC devices under the previously discussed four alternative
ownership policies is presented below.""
Ownership Policy

Potential Negative
Implications

Potential Positive
Implications

1.

Regulated but
Monopolistic
Ownership of
SHAC by
Utilities

1.

Absence of Regulated
Monopoly Justifications
2. Regulatory Issues
3. Antitrust Issues

1.

Regulated but
Competitive
Ownership of
SHAC by
Utilities

1.
2.

1.
2.

2.

Regulatory Issues
Antitrust Issues

2.

Optimized SHAC
Design for
Utility System
Operation
High Quality of
SHAC Device and
Service
Same as Above
Advantages of
Competition

omitted] . . . .It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or the strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare." Id. at 111.
117. Cal. A.B. No. 2984 (Sept. 1978) (adds § 2775.5 to the CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE).
This legislation and the events leading to its passage are considered more fully in the
text accompanying notes 140-63 infra.
118. Derived in part from SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 234; UTILrrY
AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 198.
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3.

Unregulated
Competitive
Ownership of
SHAC by Utility
Subsidiaries

I. Internal Subsidization
2. Antitrust Issues

1.

4.

Utilities and
Subsidiaries
Prohibited from
Owning SHAC

1.

1. Avoidance of
Regulatory
Issues

2.

Inferior Product
Quality
Nonoptimized SHAC
Design from Utility
Perspective
Regulation may
Develop if Competitive
Market Functions
Improperly

Same as Above

C. The Special Case of SHAC Device Ownership by Municipal Utilities
A unique situation arises if municipally-owned utilities are
permitted to own SHAC devices under the first and second
policy options. In Colorado, an exemption for municipallyowned utilities from regulation by the PUC is provided in the
Colorado constitution" 9 and is also recognized in the PUC jurisdiction section of the Public Utilities Law. 2 0 The Colorado
Supreme Court has held that the PUC has no jurisdiction to
regulate a municipally-owned utility operating wholly within
the territorial boundaries of a home rule city.'2 ' In another decision the Colorado Supreme Court held that a state constitutional provision prohibiting the PUC from regulating utilities
operated by a municipality within its boundaries did not prohibit the PUC from regulating municipally-owned utilities to
the extent of their operations outside city boundaries.'22 Therefore, the extent of PUC regulation of SHAC device ownership
activities by a municipally-owned utility in Colorado would be
confined to solar service provided outside municipal boundaries.
If a municipality were to furnish solar service to its citizens
within the municipal limits, the city itself, through its proper
officers, would possess the sole power of fixing general rental
119. COLO. CONST. art. XXV.
120. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-1-103(1).
121. City and County of Denver v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 181 Colo. 38, 45-46, 507
P.2d, 871, 874-75 (1973).
122. City of Loveland v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 580 P.2d 381, 383-85 (Colo. 1978).

1979

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

rates or regulation. 113 The extent of utility regulation by a municipality's legislative body is generally provided in the city
charter. For example, the municipal charter for one Colorado
city (Colorado Springs) provides that the city council shall "by
ordinance or resolution establish rates, rules and regulations
and extension policies for the services provided by the Department of Utilities."'2 4 The city council of Colorado Springs
maintains a policy of approving and applying the same utility
rates within municipal boundaries that the PUC has approved
for service outside the municipality. 25 It is possible, then, that
in similar cities charges for solar service provided by a municipality outside municipal limits would also apply to solar service provided within municipal limits if such charges were approved by the PUC.
Since municipally-owned utilities may be regulated only
in part either by the PUC or the municipality, it is important
to discuss whether such utilities should or may own SHAC
devices. It has been suggested that utility ownership of SHAC
devices, if confined to municipally-owned utilities, is preferable to ownership by investor- or privately-owned utilities. 2
This preference arises from the fact that a municipal utility is
(in theory at least) significantly more accountable to the public
because (1) it is a public entity, (2) it is subject to direct
control by publicly-elected officials, and (3) it does not have a
profit motive and thus would be unlikely to charge solar consumers heavy add-ons to retail cost. 7 This argument has merit
in Colorado when one considers that PUC commissioners are
not directly elected officials, but rather are appointed by the
Governor with the consent of the state senate. 2 1 On the other
hand, should a municipal utility seek to displace competition
in the solar market by taking advantage of its monopoly status,
such action would be state policy and therefore its anticompetitive SHAC system ownership activities would qualify for the
state action exemption from application of federal antitrust
laws. 121 It appears, however, that a municipal utility's relation123. See City of Lamar v.Town of Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 23,248 P. 1009, 1010 (1926).
124. COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO., CHARTER art. VI § 34.1 (1977).
125. See Colorado Springs, Colo., Ordinance 77-144 (Sept. 27, 1977).
126. See K. Bossong, supra note 63, at 6.
127. See id.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-101(1).
129. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1137
(1978) and the text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
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ships with SHAC device manufacturers or distributors would
3
be subject to Colorado's restraint of trade laws.
Existing Colorado statutes seem to authorize ownership
and control of SHAC devices by municipally-owned utilities.
The governing body of each municipality in Colorado has the
power:
(a)(I) To acquire waterworks, gasworks, and gas distribution
systems for the distribution of gas of any kind or electric light and
power works and distribution systems, including geothermal and
solar systems, and all appurtenances necessary to any of said
works or systems or to authorize the erection, ownership, operation, and maintenance of such works and systems by others.
(d) To assess from time to time, when constructing such
water, gas, geothermal, solar, or electric light works and in such
manner as it deems equitable, upon each tenement or other place
supplied with water, gas, heat, cooling, or electric light, such
water, gas, heat, cooling, or electric light rent as may be agreed
upon by the governing body.
(3) To condemn and appropriate so much private property
as is necessary for the construction and operation of water, gas,
geothermal, solar, or electric light works in such manner as may
be prescribed by law; and to condemn and appropriate any water,
gas, geothermal, solar, or electric light works not owned by such
municipality in such manner 3as may be prescribed by law for the
condemnation of real estate.' '

It is not particularly clear whether the "solar works" referred to in this statute consist of decentralized SHAC devices
or centralized systems such as solar power towers. Conceivably,
the broad solar language could be interpreted to include both
decentralized and centralized solar technologies since the services specifically referred to include heat, cooling, and electric
light, all of which can be produced by both types of solar technologies. If this interpretation is correct, the law would seem
not only to authorize municipal utilities to engage in SHAC
ownership, but also to lease SHAC devices and assess rent in
a manner agreeable to the governing body.
Municipal utility ownership of SHAC devices moved from
theory to reality in 1973 in the City of Santa Clara, Califor130. See COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 6-4-101-109. See also the text accompanying notes
103-13 supra.
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-707 (emphasis added).
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nia.'" The city-owned Santa Clara utility currently leases
SHAC devices for heating swimming pools to approximately
100 customers. In addition, the city has installed, on a trial
basis, SHAC devices for space heating in five homes. The city's
program is now part of a California Energy Commission proposal to extend the role of local government entities in the
development and commercialization of solar energy. The California municipal solar utility proposal states in part that:
[miunicipally-operated utilities are ideally suited to introduce
solar energy to consumers who are reluctant to assume the full
financial and technical risks of a solar investment. Whether the
utility leases or sells solar systems, the consumer is assured that
his equipment will be effectively maintained and repaired. When
a utility leases solar equipment or leases it with the option to buy,
the consumer avoids the problems and risks of selecting, purchasing, and installing a system.)"

The proposal is designed to result in a joint California
Energy Commission-DOE funding effort that will provide local
government entities with the information and assistance necessary to initiate their roles in solar commercialization. Among
the goals of the proposal are to (1) develop and initiate marketing efforts to establish 50 to 100 operating municipal solar utilities by 1981, (2) initiate three to four large-scale pilot solar
retrofit projects for domestic water heating in various housing
applications (e.g., low/fixed income, high-rise residential units;
low/middle income apartments; single family tracts), and (3)
establish municipal financing options that are independent of
state and local tax support. 13 Should this effort succeed, and
be duplicated elsewhere, it will thrust municipal utilities to the
forefront of SHAC system commercialization.
D. Alternative Utility Ownership Policies
One alternative to the four previously discussed SHAC
device ownership policies is to permit utilities to finance or
insure solar systems.'35 This alternative appears legally feasible
when one considers that several PUCs have expressly authorized programs by utilities to finance the installation of insulation to conserve natural gas.' 31 Such an option would directly
132. See CALIFORNIA STATE ENERGY COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT

SOLAR UTILIMEs 8 (June 14, 1978, revised July 8, 1978) (submitted by the
California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to the Department of Energy).
OF MUNICIPAL

133. Id. at 1.
134. See id. at 2.
135. See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 356.
136. E.g., Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 69 P.U.R.3d 367 (Idaho Pub. Util.
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help resolve the high "first cost" problem now plaguing solar
consumers as well as indirectly assure solar consumers of the
product's quality. Additionally, this alternative could result in
SHAC system designs more favorable to the operation of the
utility's system, i.e., solar systems requiring auxiliary energy
only during periods other than peak. Since the Colorado PUC
has the authority to investigate the practices of any utility and
to establish new practices in lieu thereof, 3 ' it could establish a
solar financing program for any utility within its jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, utilities are not likely to favor this option because they would be required to assume all the risks without
the financial benefits that would follow from including solar
financing in the rate base. In addition, solar financing would
require the utility to expend additional capital beyond that
already expended in its conventional energy service operations.
Other alternatives have been suggested by those opposed
to utility involvement in the ownership of SHAC devices.' 3
First, local governments could establish community cooperatives that could purchase large quantities of SHAC devices and
thereby take advantage of these economies of scale and assure
product quality. The devices could then be sold at a price
equivalent to cost plus administrative expenses. Second, the
unregulated solar industries themselves could establish leasing
or financing programs. A leasing program of this nature is underway in Florida. A third alternative is to limit utility participation in the solar market to servicing or maintenance programs. In conjunction with such programs, utilities could be
used as a means for collecting and distributing solar and other
energy conserving consumer information. The National Energy
Act envisions such a role for utilities.'3 9 While these alternaComm'n 1967); Re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 1 P.U.R. 4th 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1973).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-111(2).
138. The following alternatives were obtained primarily from K. Bossong, supra
note 63, at 6.
139. The National Energy Act is comprised of five separate acts: Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Publ. L. No. 95-617 (1978); Energy Tax Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-618 (1978); National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95619 (1978); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620'(1978);
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621 (1978). For a general summary of
the five acts, See OmcE oF PUBuc AFwAn, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, INFORMATION: THE
NATIONAL ENERGY ACT (Nov.
ERGY ACT FACT SHEET (1978).

1978);

ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY CONFERENCE, NATIONAL EN-

1979

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

tives have the benefit of preventing utilities from foreclosing
competition in the solar market, the rate of solar commercialization and development may be less than under a program
encouraging active involvement by utilities.
E. A Case Study of the Implications of SHAC System Ownership by Utilities in California
1. Investigation by the California PUC Energy Conservation Team
The California experience with utility involvement in ownership of SHAC devices is instructive to other states considering some degree of utility participation in the solar market.
In 1976, the California PUC Energy Conservation Team
investigated the role of solar energy in supplying the state's
energy needs. The investigation culminated in the preparation
of a report that generally concluded that California should promote the accelerated use of solar energy. This conclusion was
reached because of (1) the rising costs of fossil fuels, (2) the
uncertainty regarding the availability of fossil fuel resources,
(3) the abundance of solar energy, (4) the soon cost-effective
uses of solar energy for space conditioning and water heating,
and (5) the fact that government incentives can facilitate the
transition to the use of renewable and more abundant energy
resources. 40 The report also concluded that the role of utilities
should be to (1) provide their customers with SHAC device
information, e.g., brand names of SHAC systems meeting interim specifications and the names of reputable solar contractors, (2) provide their customers with assistance in maintaining
their SHAC devices, (3) assist their customers in financing
SHAC devices until a significant sales level of solar systems
Under the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, governors and nonregulated
utilities will submit to Department of Energy energy conservation plans requiring
utilities to inform residential customers of suggested energy conservation measures
including devices to utilize solar energy or wind power. As part of this informational
requirement, utilities must make public lists of installers and lenders who might install
and finance these energy conservation measures. For each residential customer, utilities are required to offer to inspect his residence and inform him of the estimated cost
of purchasing and installing the suggested measures as well as the expected energy
savings that are likely to result. In addition, utilities are required to offer to arrange
for the installation and financing of the suggested measures. Pub. L. No. 95-619, at
§§ 213-15.

140. See

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILmES COMMISSION ENERGY CONSERVATION TEAM,

STUDY OF THE VIABILITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS

A

OF SOLAR ENERGY APPLICATION FOR

ESSENTIAL USES IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR IN CALIFORNIA ch. 1 at 1-2 (Oct. 7, 1977).
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business is established, and (4) develop incentive offpeak rates
for backup energy service to solar equipped buildings.'4 ' The
informational, maintenance, and financing services were estimated not to require significant additional utility expenditures. Where subsidies from other nonsolar ratepayers were
considered, such subsidies seemed best limited to the development of domestic water heating and passive space conditioning
systems. 142
Of great significance was the Team's determination that
utilities have a potential advantage over private enterprise in
the marketing of SHAC devices. Utilities, if they were in the
solar business today, were estimated to be able to cut costs over
any competitor by about $200 on each system.' The California
Team found that volume purchasing by a utility could reduce
unit costs on all SHAC device components by as much as 40%
to 50%, and that the utility could reduce the cost of installation
by $100 or more on a typical water heating system.'" And with
a customer service and maintenance department already established, a utility could easily expand into the solar market.
The Team concluded that utility involvement in the direct
sales of SHAC systems was a policy question," 5 and recommended that the legislature prescribe the degree to which utilities should be allowed to manufacture, sell, or lease solar
equipment." 6 One unanimous policy recommendation was to
prohibit utility companies or their subsidiaries from manufacturing, selling, installing, and leasing SHAC equipment unless
the legislature declared that solar service was a utility service
subject to regulatoryjurisdiction."7 Noting that a utility subsidiary engaged in the marketing of SHAC devices may not fall
within PUC jurisdiction, the Team recommended that the regulated utility be precluded from using utility personnel, financial resources, and vehicles to promote the subsidiary's activities.14s
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. ch. III at 1-3.
id. at 5.
id. at 9.
id. at 8-9.
id. at 9.
id. at 11.
id.
id. at 9.
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2. The "Sunflower" Opinion
While this report by the California PUC Energy Conservation Team was being prepared, the Southern California Gas
Co. (SoCal) applied to the California PUC for authority to
engage in a solar demonstration project. The demonstration
project, called "Operation Sunflower," was to include construction and operation of approximately 315 solar systems in
various residential, commercial, and industrial structures at a
cost over the five-year life of the project of nearly $11 million.
SoCal also applied for authority to include in its rates the
amounts necessary to fund the solar energy program. SoCal
alleged in its application that the goals of the project included
(1) the investigation and determination of system costs, performance characteristics, feasibility, building and other code
revisions, safety hazards, and the scope of the utility's role in
the commercialization of solar assisted appliances, (2) analysis
of legal problems associated with solar energy, and (3) the testing of demonstration units to accelerate development of existing technologies.14 9
Seven days of public hearings were held during which interested parties representing consumers' organizations, local
governments, gas consumers, the PUC, and the State Energy
Commission presented testimony. The reaction to the SoCal
proposal was overwhelmingly negative. In the words of the
eventual PUC opinion, "[t]o say that [the consumer organizations] . . .did not support SoCal's application would be an
understatement."'' 50 The other interested parties also opposed
the project on three grounds. First, it was thought that additional solar expense should be borne by the utility's shareholders and not the utility's ratepayers. Second, the question of
utility involvement in the solar industry seemed an issue that
would be more properly resolved after an investigation by the
PUC and the Energy Commission. Third, many opposed the
thought of spending $11 million of ratepayer funds to accomplish SoCal's goals. 5 ' It is probable that the response would be
149. The solar law issues included those related to sun rights and ownership of
solar installations. Application of Southern California Gas Co. for Authority to (a)
Engage in a Solar Demonstration Project and (b) to Include in its Rates the Amounts
Necessary to Fund a Solar Energy Program, Decision No. 88224, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Dec. 13, 1977).
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 4-5.
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the same should a Colorado utility make a similar proposal.
Not surprisingly, the California PUC denied the application by SoCal to increase rates. The basis of the decision was
that "at this time it is not in the public interest to have SoCal's
ratepayers fund this 'demonstration project.""" The PUC further pointed out that the proposal may have been premature
in that the state Energy Commission was legislatively charged
with carrying out studies assessing the nature of solar energy
resources to meet the needs of the state. 5 3 Since such studies
were not complete, proposals such as SoCal's would not be
favorably received.
3. 'Legislation Regarding Utility and Subsidiary Manufacture, Leasing, Sales and Ownership of Solar Energy Systems
California's interest in regulating utility involvement with
solar matters did not end with the PUC Energy Conservation
Team investigation and the Sunflower opinion. A joint investigation by the PUC and the Energy Commission was instituted
in 1976 to determine whether solar technologies might supply
a significant part of the state's future energy needs. The initial
phase of the proceeding encompassed twenty-two days of hearings and resulted in proposed joint findings and conclusions
from both staffs. 5 On the issue of direct utility involvement in
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 5 n.1. The particular legislation cited in the opinion charging the
Energy Commission to carry out research into alternative sources of energy is CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 25401, 25216(c) (West 1977).
154. Joint Investigation by the Pub. Util. Comm'n and the Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Comm'n into the Availability and Potential Use of
Solar Energy in California, CPUC Case No. 10150, ERCDC No. 76-R&D-1 (April 14,
1978) (proposed joint findings and conclusions of the staffs). The California PUC
ordered that:
an investigation is instituted by the California Public Utilities Commission to determine and evaluate the proposed programs for the sales, leasing, installation and related servicing of solar devices by public utilities
subject to this Commission's jurisdiction. This investigation is for the
purpose of adopting rules or appropriate orders to insure that such programs preserve the competitive nature of the solar industry and protect
the interests of individual solar product consumers, while placing no
undue burden on the utilities' ratepayers.
* . . no utility under the jurisdiction of this Commission may proceed, in a manner which utilizes ratepayer funds, with the implementation of a program for the direct sales, leasing, installation and related
servicing of solar devices without authorization from this Commission.
. . .any utility under the jurisdiction of this Commission which now

1979

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

sales, leasing, and ownership of SHAC devices it was found
that (1) utilities appeared to have a distinct and potentially
unfair marketing advantage over others seeking to sell or lease
SHAC devices, (2) California utilities were interested in entering the solar energy field, and (3) representatives of the solar
industry and various consumer groups opposed utility ownership, sales, or leasing of SHAC equipment. 55 From these findings it was concluded that utilities should be allowed to enter
the solar market on a limited basis only when such entrance
was approved and monitored by the PUC. The extent to which
utilities may be able to own, sell, or lease SHAC devices was
left unsettled. However, it was thought that since utilities
could be used as a means of accelerating the commercialization
of solar energy, they should be able to finance, service, and
collect data on SHAC systems. 5'
As a follow up to this investigation, California enacted a
statute in late 1978 which provided the state with a mechanism
for regulating privately-owned utilities desiring to enter the
solar market through the manufacture, sale, leasing, ownership
or control of solar systems. 57 The legislative findings and declarations are significant. They acknowledge the need for and desirability of a truly competitive solar market, and seek to guarantee such a market by PUC regulation of utilities. The legislature deduced that:
it is in the best interest of the state to ensure competition in the
solar energy industry [and to ensure that] . . . the solar energy
industry... has the potential to be a truly competitive energy
industry.
...the current uncertainty with regard to the role of electrical and gas public utilities with regard to solar energy developor in the future intends to proceed with a program for the direct sales,
leasing, installation and related servicing of solar devices, notwithstanding the above order, must file with this Commission a full description and
report on present and proposed programs for the sale, leasing, installation
and related servicing of solar energy systems by each respondent utility,
discussing [various enumerated concerns] ....

within 30 days from

the effective date of this order.
Order Instituting Investigation by the Public Utilities Commission into Intended Programs for the Sales, Leasing, Installation and Related Servicing of Solar Devices by
Public Utilities, 0.1.1. No. 13, at 2-3 (April 4, 1978).
155. CPUC Case No. 10150 at 27-28.
156. Id. at 28-29.
157. Cal. A.B. No. 2984 (Sept. 1978) (adds § 2775.5 to the CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE).
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ment hinders the full-scale development of the solar energy industry, and therefore requires legislative clarification.
' . . there may be an inherent conflict for a public utility
which furnishes gas and electricity on the one hand and develops
solar energy on the other hand, and. . . it would be detrimental
to the solar energy industry and to the state if privately owned
public utilities used their status as monopolies to dominate the
solar energy industry or exercise unfair market power.
' . . the basis for regulation of public utilities extends to
their participation in solar energy development as well as in the
production and delivery of energy from conventional sources.
It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature that the Public
Utility Commission be given a clear and explicit mandate to
regulate the involvement of privately owned public utilities in
solar energy development, and to ensure that the solar energy
industry develops in a manner which is competitive and free from
the potential dominance of regulated electrical and gas corporations.'1'

Under this statute when an electrical or gas corporation or
any subsidiary thereof desires to manufacture, sell, lease or
otherwise own or control any "solar energy system," it must
first obtain the authorization of the PUC. 5° "Solar energy system" means equipment that uses solar energy to provide heating, cooling, or electricity and which has a useful life of at least
three years. An electric plant is expressly excluded from the
definition.'" PUC authorization is not required where a utility
decides to own or control any solar system for "experimental
or demonstration purposes," or where the utility engages in a
limited program of installation or use whose sole purpose is to
investigate the cost-effectiveness of a solar application.'"'
Once the utility has formally described its proposed solar
program, the PUC is directed to grant authorization for the
program if it finds that (1) the program will neither restrict
competition nor restrict growth in the solar energy industry, (2)
the program will not unfairly employ any financial, marketing,
distributing, or generating advantage the company may exercise by virtue of its public utility status, and (3) the program
will accelerate the development and use of solar energy systems
158. Id.at § 1.
159. Id.at § 2(a).

160. Id. at § 2(d).
161. Id.at § 2(a).
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for the duration of the program.' The PUC also has the authority to suspend or terminate any authorization whenever it
finds the solar program no longer meets the above requirements.

3

Of course, the California statute must be implemented by
the state PUC before its impact can be known. It seems,
though, that California policy reflects the tension that exists
regarding the marketing of SHAC devices. On the one hand,
the state will not tolerate utilities using their inherent advantages to foreclose or discourage competition by industries manufacturing or selling SHAC devices. On the other hand, the
state wishes to speed the market acceptance of solar technologies and seeks to rely on utilities (and their marketing
strengths) to be a primary instrument in this accelerated commercialization effort. The state's PUC is responsible for reconciling these competing policies and it remains to be seen how
it will do so.
F. Utility Ownership, Sale, and Leasing of SHAC Devices
and the National Energy Act.
In 1977, President Carter submitted to Congress a draft of
proposed legislation to establish a comprehensive national energy policy."' After a year of modification by the House and
Senate, the Congress passed a National Energy Act (NEA)
which was signed by the President in 1978.165 Under the NEA,
162. Id. at § 2(b).
163. Id. at § 2(c).

164. The President of the United States, National Energy Act: A Draft of Proposed Legislation to Establish a Comprehensive National Energy Policy, H.R. Doc.
No. 95-138, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
165. The House version of the National Energy Act was passed by that body on
Aug. 5, 1977. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). As with the President's proposal, the House version contained provisions requiring each state regulatory authority
and nonregulated utility to submit a residential energy conservation plan to the federal
government. These plans were to include utility programs consisting of, inter alia,

procedures whereby a utility will offer to install or finance certain conservation measures provided that the program adequately prevented unfair, deceptive, or anticompetitive acts. Within the Act, residential energy conservation measureswere defined to
include "devices to utilize solar energy or windpower for any residential energy conservation purpose, including (but not limited to) heating of water, space heating or
cooling." H.R. 8444 at 101(10)(I). After two years from the date of enactment of the
proposed House bill, utilities would be required to offer to install suggested energy
conservation measures included in the utility programs. Utilities would have been
prohibited from installing residential energy conservation measures under the House
proposal if (1) it was determined by the PUC or FEA that a sufficient number of
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utilities are prohibited from supplying or installing any energy
conservation measures except for (1) clock thermostats, (2)
devices to increase the efficiency of furnaces (e.g., flue constrictors), and (3) load management devices (e.g., equipment that
allows utilities to control a customer's load). This prohibition
does not apply to energy conservation measures that were required or permitted by a law or regulation in effect on or before
the date of enactment of the NEA, or to measures that were
being installed or supplied by a utility on or before the enactment date. Moreover, the Secretary of Energy is authorized to
waive the prohibition upon petition of a utility and if it is found
that (1), fair and reasonable prices would be charged and (2)
such activity would not be inconsistent with the prevention of
unfair or deceptive practices.' Therefore, utilities appear to be
prohibited from "installing" or "supplying" SHAC devices,
although the legislation is silent as to whether utilities may
own such devices. Utilities are allowed to make small loans of
no more than $300 for the purchase or installation of specified
conservation measures, including solar and windpower equipment for water heating, space heating, and space cooling."s7
National concern regarding the role of utilities in solar
commercialization was expressed in ways other than in the
NEA. In 1978 the White House initiated a Domestic Policy
Review of solar energy which concluded that the federal govsuppliers of suggested measures existed within the area served by the utility, (2) the
PUC, FEA, or FTC determined that supplying or installing such measures by a utility
would have a substantial anticompetitive effect, or (3) the PUC or FEA determined
that prohibiting utilities from engaging in such activities would not substantially
reduce the number of residential customers likely to have such measures installed. In
effect, both regulated and nonregulated utilities would have been permitted to install,
supply, or finance SHAC devices under the House's National Energy Act proposal.
The Senate's proposal, passed by that body on Sept. 13, 1977, would have
allowed the governor of each state and each nonregulated utility to submit residential
energy conservation plans to the FEA. H.R. 5037, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). As with
the House proposal, these plans were to include utility programs which allowed utilities to offer to install or finance suggested measures as prescribed by the Administrator
of the FEA. Utilities would have been prohibited from installing residential energy
conservation measures or making a loan to finance the purchaser installation of such
measures. Therefore, under the Senate's version, the extent to which a utility could
become involved in the installation or financing of SHAC devices would have been left
to the discretion of the Administrator of the FEA (now the Department of Energy).
166. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619 § 216 (1978).
See also Conference Report: National Energy Conservation Policy Act, S. Rep. No. 951294, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 99-100 (1978).
167. Pub. L. No. 95-619 at § 216.
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ernment should establish a role for utilities that will accelerate
solar implementation without threatening competition, product innovation, small solar businesses, or the opportunity of
firms and citizens to enjoy the benefits of privately-owned
SHAC systems.' 8 The Domestic Policy report suggested federal
action to (1) encourage utility programs leading to increased
solar system installations, (2) encourage utility supply planning consideration of decentralized and centralized solar applications, (3) explore the feasibility of using utilities or cooperatives to provide solar-derived heat, gas, or electricity on a community scale, and (4) support research and development to
insure the availability of future systems for utility applications.'

It is significant to note that the Domestic Policy report
specifically recommended that the federal government encourage utilities to finance, sell, lease, install, and service onsite
solar equipment. It also thought it appropriate for federal agencies to support PUCs that consider solar technologies in their
supply planning and decisionmaking processes. 0 Thus, while
the NEA may be silent as to utility roles regarding the sale,
leasing, and servicing of SHAC devices, the federal government
is not unaware of the issues and in fact is considering strategies
that promote solar commercialization and at the same time
maintain competition in the solar energy industry.
III.

SOLAR UTILITY COMPETITION WITH EXISTING REGULATED
ELECTRIC UTILITIES

To what extent may a solar utility legally compete with
existing regulated utilities in providing electric service? To
answer this question requires an understanding of the nature
of a solar utility. A solar utility produces electricity by means
of some centralized electricity-producing solar technology. The
three technologies that may be used by such a utility are conversion of sunlight to heat (solar thermal), direct conversion of
wind to electricity (WECS), and direct conversion of sunlight
to electricity (photovoltaics). Solar utilities, like existing electric utilities, may be investor-owned, municipally-owned, or
federally-owned.
168. See STATUS REPORT ON SoLAR ENERGY DOMESTIC Poucy REVIEW ch. VI at 8
(Aug. 28, 1978) (Public Review Copy, Draft).

169. See id. at 9-11.
170. See id.
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The discussion that follows addresses the legal barriers
that may be presented to a solar utility that seeks to compete
with an existing electric utility for electric service customers.
Significant legal issues arise once a solar utility is able to compete for service, but such issues are beyond the scope of this
article. Some of these issues include (1) power plant siting, (2)
securing access to sunlight and/or wind easements, (3) securing
easements on or over those of another public utility, (4) financing capital expenditures, (5) environmental issues, (6) adequacy of service regulations, and (7) ratemaking and other regulatory concerns.
A. Competition by Investor- or Privately-Owned Solar
Utilities
1. PUC Jurisdiction
Article XXV of the Colorado constitution 7 ' recognizes the
broad authority of the PUC to regulate the facilities, service,
rates, and charges of any public utility within Colorado. In
Colorado, suppliers of electrical energy, including cooperative
electric associations or nonprofit electric corporations, are classified as public utilities and are therefore subject to PUC jurisdiction, control, and regulation and to the Public Utilities
Law. 12 The Supreme Court of Colorado has interpreted the

Colorado Constitution and the Public Utilities Law to mean
that jurisdiction over the adequacy, installation, and extension
of power services, as well as jurisdiction over the facilities nec171. The Colorado constitutional provision provides that:
In addition to the powers now vested in the General Assembly of the
State of Colorado, all power to regulate the facilities, service and rates
and charges therefor, including facilities and service and rates and
charges therefor within home rule cities and home rule towns, of every
corporation, individual, or association of individuals, wheresoever situate

or operating within the State of Colorado, whether within or without a
home rule city or home rule town, as a public utility, as presently or as
may hereafter be defined as a public utility by the laws of the State of
Colorado, is hereby vested in such agency of the State of Colorado as the
General Assembly shall by law designate.
Until such time as the General Assembly may otherwise designate,
said authority shall be vested in the Public Utilities Commission of the
State of Colorado; provided however, nothing herein shall affect the
power of municipalities to exercise reasonable police and licensing powers, nor their power to grant franchises; and provided, further, that nothing herein shall be construed to apply to municipally owned utilities.
172. CoLO. Rev. STAT. § 40-1-103(2) (1973).
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essary to supply, extend,
and connect the service, is exclusively
3
vested in the PUC.17
Under these principles, a solar company that desired to
supply electric energy to the public or to members of an association formed by the company would be subject to PUC jurisdiction. So too, if a group of home, condominium, or apartment
owners forms an association and erects facilities to provide solar generated electricity to themselves, the association may be
classified as a public utility and find itself subject to PUC
jurisdiction. Conceivably, a shopping center, research park, or
other facility operating a solar powered generating system for
its own use may also be classified as a public utility if its
tenants are considered to be "members" of an association.
The majority court rule confirms these conclusions. Most
courts hold that public utility status is accorded to a company
if it has "dedicated its property to public use."' 74 In Munn v.
Illinois,'7 5 the Supreme Court established the principle that
when one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, i.e., when used in a manner to affect the community at large, he must submit to be regulated. The owner
may then have to face the prospect of having the property and
its operations controlled by the public for the common good.
The Colorado Supreme Court has agreed that:
to fall into the class of a public utility, a business or enterprise
must be impressed with a public interest and ... those engaged
in the conduct thereof must hold themselves out as serving or
ready to serve all members of the public, who may require it, to
the extent of their capacity. "'

Any organization that so holds itself out as serving some of the
public's power needs through solar technologies may be considered a utility.
Under the minority rule, certain activities that do not involve a dedication of property to the public use may nonetheless be "so affected with the public interest" as to give rise to
PUC jurisdiction. This rule was applied in Cottonwood Mall
173. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 128, 134, 414
P.2d 911, 914 (1966). See also City and County of Denver v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 181
Colo. 38, 43-44, 507 P.2d 871, 873 (1973).
174. E.g., Allen v. R. R. Comm'n of California, 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466 (1918).
175. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).

176. City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 300, 229 P.2d
667, 672-73 (1951).
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Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co.,' 77 where a
shopping center constructed an electric generating plant designed to supply power to its tenants. The court held that since
both the shopping center tenants and the public at large would
benefit from the supply of power, the activity conferred public
utility status upon the shopping center. The shopping center
was then subject to PUC regulation." 8 Under either rule, it
seems certain that a private solar company desiring to generate
electricity for public distribution both within a municipality
and in other areas would qualify as a public utility and be
subject to PUC jurisdiction.
2. Consequences of PUC Jurisdiction
Colorado public utilities law has a key impact on the ability of solar utilities to compete with existing regulated utilities.
By Colorado statute, the construction of either a new facility
or an extension of an existing system by a public utility cannot
begin until the utility first obtains a certificate stating that the
present or future public convenience and necessity requires the
construction.' 79 In Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,80 the Colorado Supreme Court held that this
certification statute is the foundation of the regulated monopoly principle and was designed to prevent the duplication of
facilities and competition between utilities. Therefore, the
statute subjects proposals for the construction of new or expanded facilities to the judgment of the PUC.
A further provision provides that when the PUC finds that
there is or will be a duplication of service by public utilities in
any area, the PUC shall in its discretion (1) issue a certificate
assigning specific territories to one or each of the utilities, or
177. 440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971).
178. Id. at 42.
179. COLO. Rv. STAT. § 40-5-101(1). Certain exemptions from application of the
statute are provided for extensions of facilities necessary in the ordinary course of
business (1) within any city, county, or town within which a utility is already lawfully
operating, (2) into territory either within or without a city, county, or town contiguous
to the utility's facilities and not already served by a public utility providing the same
service, and (3) within or to territory already served by the utility. In Western Colo.
Power v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 428 P.2d 922 (1967) the Supreme Court of
Colorado stated that these exceptions are for "housekeeping" purposes, allowing the
legislature to permit extensions necessary in the ordinary course of business without
further application for a certificate. Id. at 71, 428 P.2d at 927.
180. 159 Colo. 262, 273, 411 P.2d 785, 791, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).
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otherwise define the conditions of rendering service and (2)
order the elimination of the duplication upon "just and reasonable terms."' 8 ' Under the statute, it is mandatory that the applicant, prior to the construction of any new plant or system,
prove that the public convenience and necessity requires such
construction.'8 2 Where a utility has not expanded service into
an uncertified area, that area remains open for certification by
the usual procedures." 3 However, an intruding utility may not
claim service in an area already adequately served by an existing utility.' 4
A solar company desiring to construct a solar electric generating plant, as well as the necessary facilities for distribution,
would therefore be required to seek and obtain a certificate. It
is the certificate that will prove the major obstacle to a solar
utility participating in the power generation market. At present, the likelihood of a solar utility being able to acquire a
certificate is extremely limited because, except for a few uninhabited areas, the entire state is certified to existing utilities
for electricity.8 5 There are only two ways for a solar utility to
acquire a certificate-(1) if existing utilities were found to be
inadequate, or (2) if solar generated electricity were considered
to be a "new" utility service. Unfortunately, the PUC has
rarely determined that utility service is inadequate. 6 Nor is
there historical basis for the PUC to distinguish between electricity supplied by fossil fuel plants and that generated by
other means-hydroelectric, nuclear, or solar.1"1
Even assuming solar generated electricity constitutes a
new utility service, the ability of a solar utility to acquire a
certificate would depend on whether the proposed solar service
181. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-5-101(2).
182. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 273, 411 P.
2d 785, 791, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S.
984 (1966).
183. See Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 71-72, 428
P.2d 922, 927-28 (1967).
184. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Home Light & Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 83, 428 P.2d
928, 934 (1967).
185. See K. HILLHOUSE, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECrIVES ON SOLAR ENERGY
IN COLORADO 65, 73 (Nov.1977) (prepared for the National Science Foundation, Grant
No. APR-75-18247).
186. See Town of Fountain v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 302, 447 P.2d 527
(1968).
187. See K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185, at 65.
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area is certified to an existing utility for electric service. If the
area is already certified, the solar utility would be required, in
addition to establishing the necessity and public convenience
of the solar electric service, to show that the existing utility is
either unwilling or unable to satisfy the demand for solar electric service.' 88 The likelihood of such a showing is diminished
by the fact that the existing utility's right to provide utility
service under its certificate within its defined area constitutes
a property right that cannot be taken without due process of
89
law. 1
In Town of Fountainv. Public Utilities Commission,'l the
Colorado Supreme Court indicated the conditions that must be
present before a utility (e.g. a solar utility) may apply for and
properly receive a certificate from the PUC to provide utility
service in an area previously certified to another utility. Fountain received a certificate to supply electricity to the area surrounding the town. The eastern one-half of this area contained
no lines or distribution facilities from which to provide service.
Another utility, Mountain View Electric Association, Inc., was
certified in areas adjacent to Fountain's area and subsequently
received authorization from the PUC to extend operations into
Fountain's certified but unserved area. The reason for the decision was that the public convenience and necessity required
Mountain View's service. Fountain objected to the PUC's determination but the court affirmed, holding that "[a] utility
may apply for a certificate to serve in a certified area if it
appears that the certified utility is either unwilling or unable
to serve any existing or newly developing load within its certified territory . . . ."I' After Fountain, if a solar utility desires
to acquire a certificate to serve an area already certified to
another utility, the former must show that the latter is unwilling or unable to adequately provide the service. In Fountain,
an absence of facilities appeared to be the key fact indicating
an inability to serve the area. A similar showing would probably be necessary before a solar utility could be certified.
188. See text accompanying notes 190-94 infra.
189. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 69, 428 P.2d
922, 926-27 (1967). See also K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185, at 73.
190. 167 Colo. 302, 447 P.2d 527 (1968).
191. Id. at 307, 447 P.2d at 529. See also Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Home Light and
Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 428 P.2d 928 (1967).
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It is conceivable that other factors could be used to prove
an unwillingness or inability to provide service. For example,
economic infeasibility' or fuel shortages might constitute the
existence of an inadequate existing service.9 3 A legislative or
PUC declaration that solar generated electricity is a "new"
utility service may also lessen the burden on a solar electric
utility seeking to establish an unwillingness to serveparticularly where an existing certified utility chooses not to
generate by means of solar. However, it has been held that
the first utility certified should be given the opportunity to
supply any needed service before any other utility is allowed
to compete with it."'
No guidelines exist as the PUC criteria regarding approval
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct
a public utility facility.9 5 With such broad discretion in making
its decision on a certificate, the PUC could consider the economic interests of the utility's customers or even the economic
feasibility of constructing a solar power plant over one fueled
by conventional energy sources. There is at present no requirement that the PUC take into account such social costs as environmental degradation and depletion of nonrenewable resources, but should the PUC consider economic factors in its
decisionmaking deliberations, such costs must be included.
The Colorado Supreme Court has in one instance sanctioned an economic feasibility analysis that suggested the usefulness of decisions that factor in costs of a social nature. In
International Union, UMW of America v. Public Utilities
Commission,' it was implied that a PUC decison granting a
certificate could be questioned where another type of power
192. See text accompanying notes 196-97 infra.
193. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d
543, cert. denied, Union Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 364 U.S.
820 (1960). In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the authority of the
PUC to grant extension rights to utilities for service to areas certified to other utilities

if adequate service is not being provided and the public convenience and necessity so
requires. Id. at 151, 350 P.2d at 551. See also Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 411 P.2d 785, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22, rehearingdenied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).
194. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 149, 350 P.2d
543, 550, cert. denied, Union Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 364 U.S.
820 (1960) (quoting South Suburban Motor Coach Co. v. Levin 269 Ill.
App. 323
(1934)).
195. See K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185, at 72.
196. 170 Colo. 556, 560; 463 P.2d 465, 467 (1970).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

plant had a distinct and measurable economic advantage over
the type certified.'9 7 Thus, when the solar thermal power plant
alternative becomes economically competitive, a solar utility
could argue that present economic and technical conditions
support certification of a solar plant over one conventionally
fueled. As times change and future social costs become more
of a factor in policy considerations, the PUC might begin consideration of these costs as part of an economic feasibility analysis. When this change occurs, a solar utility would be in a good
position to point out the social and environmental advantages
of solar thermal generation over conventional power generation.
Another method by which a solar utility can gain entry
into the electric service market is to purchase an existing utility's certificate of public convenience and necessity. A Colorado statute provides that:
any certificate of public convenience and necessity or rights obtained under any such certificate held, owned, or obtained by any
public utility, may be sold, assigned, or leased as any other property other than in the normal course of business but only upon

authorizationby the Commission and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may prescribe.18

The ability of a solar utility to purchase a certificate from
an existing utility thus rests in the discretion of the PUC. This
discretion would nevertheless be substantially limited by the
bargaining position of the existing utility. The authority of the
PUC to exercise discretion relating to the sale of a certificate
does not give the PUC the power to order the sale, for to do so
might constitute a taking of property without just compensation."19
197. In the UMW case, Public Service Co. of Colorado applied for a certificate to
construct the nuclear generating station at Ft. St. Vrain. The UMW contested the
issuance of the certificate on the grounds that (1) there was a lack of evidence upon
which the economic feasibility of the project could be determined and (2) the nuclear
plant would constitute an undue risk to the health and safety of the general public.
The court stated that changes in technology, pollution regulations, and the cost of fuel
may in the future make fossil fueled plants economically unfeasible. The court further
stated that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the PUC's finding that
neither a fossil-fueled plant nor a nuclear plant had a measurable economic advantage
over the other and that the proposed project was therefore economically feasible. Id.
at 560-61, 463 P.2d at 467.
198. CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 40-5-105 (1973) (emphasis added).
199. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Home Light & Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 85, 428 P.2d
928, 935 (1967).
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An additional disincentive awaits solar utilities wishing to
provide service within a municipality. As with other utilities,
a privately-owned solar utility desiring to operate exclusively
within a municipality would be subject to the certification process.m In addition, either local laws might require a private
utility serving the customers in a municipality to obtain a fran"
chise, or a utility might seek a franchise on its own initiative.',
However, in attempting to compete for service within a municipality, a solar utility may be in violation of an earlier franchise
granted to an existing utility. Whether a violation would in fact
occur by the competing solar utility depends on the specific
provisions of the franchise. Nevertheless, since the municipal
franchises are analogous to the monopoly status that is conferred by a certificate, such franchise could represent yet another barrier to a private solar utility's ability to compete with
existing utilities.
3. Suggested Alternatives
There are several means by which the aforementioned barriers to electric service competition by a privately-owned solar
utility may be removed. It has been suggested that PUCs could
simply declare that they will choose not to exercise jurisdiction
over solar electric generating facilities. Such a policy could be
beneficial to solar development and electric customers if the
policy was confined to certification procedures. Otherwise consumers of solar generated electricity would not be accorded the
protection that rate202 and service20 3 regulation normally provides. Utilities threatened by competition would also likely
respond that under the PUC jurisdictional statute, 2114 the PUC
is compelled to exercise jurisdiction over any entity declared as
a matter of law to be affected with a public interest. Solar
utilities would fall within this definition and would therefore
be subject to PUC jurisdiction.
Another possible means of allowing competition by a solar
utility is to permit competition legislatively. A statute could
200. See note 171 supra.
201. See K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185 at 80.
202. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-101(1) requiring that all charges received by any
public utility for any service rendered be just and reasonable.
203. See id. at § 40-3-101(2) wherein it is provided that utility service shall promote the public safety and in all respects be just and reasonable.
204. CoO. Rav. STAT. § 40-1-103.
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simply state that the public interest demands that a utility
providing solar generated electricity be permitted to compete
with existing utilities. Such a law would either remove the
certification requirement or could be drafted to exempt solar
utilities from PUC jurisdiction. Once competition is allowed,
electric consumers could not be compelled to take service from
one utility, but rather would be able to select service from the
20 5
utility of their own choice.
Since a certificate in Colorado grants a utility a right to
serve the public within its certified area, such a right constitutes a legally protected property right.2 0 6 Therefore, either of
the two above alternatives would be contested by the certified
utility as amounting to a taking of property without due process.207 It is true that the Constitution's protection against the
taking of private property for a public use without just compensation is limited by a state's ability to regulate pursuant to the
police power. However, when the regulation goes too far it may
be recognized as a taking without just compensation.205 A law
that voids an existing utility's certificate which results in a
significant loss of customers may be an example of regulation
going too far.
California law offers a final example of how one state has
approached the issue of solar utility competition with existing,
regulated electrical utilities. In 1976, the California legislature
enacted legislation encouraging the development of new
sources of natural gas and electricity. 0 9 Private energy producers are broadly defined within the legislation to include persons or entities generating electricity from other than conventional sources for their own use and not for sale to others..2 The
statute to a certain extent exempts privately-owned solar utilities from PUC jurisdiction as it provides that: "[a] private
energy producer shall not be found to be an electrical corporation . . .as defined in this code solely because the electricity
205. See, e.g., Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C.
278, 128 S.E.2d 405 (1962); Cass County Elec. Coop. v. Otter Tail Power Co., 93
N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1958).
206. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 69, 428 P. 2d
922, 926-27 (1967).
207. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
208. See id. at 415.
209. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2801-16 (West Supp. 1978).
210. Id. at § 2802.
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• . . is being transmitted in part through facilities owned by a
public utility."'2"1 Another section of the statute allows such
utilities to use existing public utility transmission facilities
where it is necessary to transmit the electricity from the generating source to the point of end use.212 The statute provides an
incentive for solar utilities in that it allows such utilities to use
existing utility facilities without sanction of PUC regulations.
Such strategies should be considered in other states seeking to
promote solar power.
B. Competition by Municipally-Owned Solar Utilities
Municipally-owned utilities, to the extent of their operations within municipal boundaries, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the PUC in Colorado. And under article XX of the
Colorado constitution, home rule cities are empowered to manage local and municipal matters, including the construction,
acquisition, and operation of municipal utilities. 1 3 Since statutory and home rule cities are not subject to PUC jurisdiction,
utilities owned by municipalities have broad potential for experimenting with, developing, and operating solar facilities. In
partial recognition of this potential the Colorado legislature in
1975 granted municipalities the power to acquire or erect solar
systems." 4 The statute provides that the governing body of
each municipality has the power to acquire electric light and
power works, including "solar systems and all appurtenances
necessary to the operation of such works." The somewhat ambiguous language would seem to include solar systems designed
to generate electricity.
The statute further provides that the municipality has the
right to purchase or condemn the facilities of an existing franchise at their fair market value. Under this statute, and a Colorado Supreme Court case interpreting it,"' existing franchises
within a municipality would not present a barrier to a municipality desiring to establish a solar municipal utility. A municipality could therefore condemn for purchase the electric works
of any electric utility operating within municipal limits and
211.
212.
213.
214.
supra.
215.

Id.
Id. at § 2812.5
COLO. CONST. art. XX §§ 1, 6.
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 31-15-707 (1973). See also text accompanying note 131
Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493 (1926).
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subsequently construct a solar generating facility to establish
a solar municipal utility." 6 To the extent of solar electric service provided withih municipal boundaries, the municipallyowned solar utility would not be subject to PUC jurisdiction
and hence the certification procedures.
The Colorado Supreme Court has confirmed that a municipality seeking to provide a public service is not barred by the
existence of a certified privately-owned utility company providing a similar service. In United States Disposal Systems
(USDS), Inc. v. City of Northglenn,1 7 the city passed an ordinance authorizing it to provide trash removal services. USDS
argued that since it held a certificate granted by the PUC, the
ordinance constituted an invalid exercise of the police power
and a taking of private property without compensation. The
court concluded that the ordinance had a fair relation to the
protection of the public health, and held that the municipality's actions constituted a reasonable exercise of the police
power."1 ' More importantly, the court stated that under the
Colorado constitution the PUC (1) cannot interfere with municipalities in the exercise of their police power and (2) has no
jurisdiction over municipally-owned utilities."9 The acquisition by a municipality of electric power works for the purpose
of establishing a solar electric utility would probably be construed as a valid exercise of the police power, and the existence
of a PUC certificate granted to an existing utility would therefore constitute no legal barrier to this action.
In the absence of statutory and judicial law such as that
found in Colorado, common law and constitutional provisions
would govern the extent to which a municipality seeking to
compete with an existing utility could ignore a previously issued franchise. A municipality that wishes to compete with an
existing utility would be subject to scrutiny under the contract
216. A municipality could not purchase generating plants constructed for private
use, or use outside the municipality. See Pikes Peak Power Co. v. City of Colorado
Springs, 105 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1900). Moreover, where a franchise has been granted to a
private company to provide electric service within a municipality, the electric power
works cannot be condemned or purchased within twenty years after the granting of the
franchise without the consent of the owner of the franchise. CoLo. RFv. STAT. § 31-15707(a)(IV).
217. 567 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1977).
218. Id. at 367.
219. Id. at 368.
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clause and fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. 2 ' The
contract clause guarantees that no state shall impair the obligations of contract 22' and the fourteenth amendment protects
against takings by a state of private property without due pro222
cess of law.

Inasmuch as a municipal franchise to an existing utility is
recognized as a binding contract, 223 it is possible to argue that
the municipality has contracted to give the utility the exclusive
right to provide service. Impairment of such an agreement
would be actionable under the contract clause. 224 However, it

has been held that the grant of a franchise carries with it no
implied contract which would foreclose competition by the
municipality. 225 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that

the contract clause is not only:
qualified by the measure of control which the State retains over
remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not
matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of
modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." [citation
omitted] .

.

. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in

order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order . ..

.

Therefore, a franchise granted to a utility by a municipality
must be construed in accordance with the municipality's authority to exercise its police power. Since the establishing of a
municipally-owned solar utility would promote the health,
safety, and welfare of the public, such an action would be considered a valid exercise of the police power.
An existing utility would have a stronger defense against
competition from a municipally-owned solar utility where the
220. WILSON, JONES, MORTON, & LYNCH, THE SUN: A MUNICIPAL UTILITY ENERGY
SOURCE 3 (1976) (prepared for the city of Santa Clara, California with the support of

the Energy Research and Development Administration, Contract No. E(04-3)-1083)
(hereinafter cited as MUNIcIPAL ENERGY SOURCEI.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1.
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
223. Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 432 (1929).
224. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
225. Madera Waterworks v. City of Madera, 228 U.S. 454,456 (1913); Skaneateles
Waterworks Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354, 363 (1902).
226. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508, rehearing denied, 380
U.S. 926 (1965), (citing and quoting from Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1934)).
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express terms of the franchise provide that the company is to
provide service free of competition from any other entities, including the municipality. Where a private utility holds a franchise that explicitly precludes the municipality from operating
a similar facility, the former will find protection under the
contract clause. 2 7 If solar electric service were considered to
be a "new" utility service, though, an exclusive franchise for a
given type of service would not protect the holder from solar
utility competition. 22 And if the power of a municipality to
operate a utility is granted by the state constitution,2 9 the
municipality will be allowed to compete even if the terms of the
franchise to the private utility expressly prohibit solar competition by the municipality. Such a result is due to the fact that
a franchise granted pursuant to state statute cannot abrogate
the power constitutionally vested in a municipality. 30 The
Contract Clause will thus pose only a minor limitation on a
municipal solar utility seeking to compete with a franchised,
existing electrical utility.
If a private utility cannot use the contract clause to defeat municipal competition, it will claim that such municipal
involvement in the franchised area amounts to a "taking" of
private property under the fourteenth amendment.2' Such an
argument is likely to be unsuccessful. In New Orleans GasLight Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., it was held that when a
private utility has been granted a franchise which precludes
competition, the authorization by the municipality of a similar
venture does not constitute a taking when such authorization
is an exercise of the police power. 2 To the argument that the
municipality's competition would deprive the private utility of
its property without due process, the Court in another case
replied that: "the decisions of this Court leave no doubt that a
state [or a municipality by delegated authority] may, in the
public interest, constitutionally engage in a business commonly carried on by a private enterprise, . . . [citations omit227. New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
228. See Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429 (1929).
229. See COLO.CONST. art. XX, §§ 1, 6.
230. See MUNICIPAL ENERGY SOURcE, supra note 220 at 4.
231. The rights granted in a municipal franchise have been held to constitute
property rights entitled to protection by the fourteenth amendment. City of Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 (1919).
232. 115 U.S. 650, 671-72 (1885).
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ted] and compete with private interests engaged in a like activity. ' ' 33 It seems, then, that regardless of whether the private
utility asserts contract clause or takings claims, the question
of whether a solar municipal utility may compete with a franchised utility will be determined according to whether the
municipality is acting within the scope of the police power.23
The final possible limitation on municipal solar utility
competition with existing private utilities is the array of federal
antitrust laws. Municipalities are not likely to be subject to the
antitrust laws after the Supreme Court announced in Parker v.
Brown that the Sherman Act's coverage does not extend "to
restrain state action or official action directed by a state. 23 .
The Parkerstate action exemption as applied to a municipallyowned utility was more recently considered in City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., where the Supreme Court held
that actions of municipalities are exempt by the Parker doctrine when such actions are "engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy . . . ."2 The constitutional or statutory
authority that a municipality in Colorado exerts to acquire or
operate a municipal solar utility should easily qualify the action for the state action exemption from the antitrust laws.
C. Competition by Federally-OwnedSolar Utilities
To what extent may solar utilities owned by the federal
government compete with private, electric utilities? Existing
federal power agencies such as the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority are basically generating and marketing agencies permitted to enter into contracts
for the wholesale distribution of electric energy.2 7 With the
exception of the Rural Electrification Administration, the federal power authorities do not generally market electric energy
directly to individual consumers on a retail basis23
233.
234.
(1913).
235.
236.

Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624 (1934).
See Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544

317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
98 S.Ct. 1123, 1137 (1978).
237. See E. BERLIN, C. CICcHrMr, & W. GILL N, PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 157-63
(1974) (Appendix C). Appendix C of the publication provides an excellent summary
of federal power agencies.
238. Under the Rural Electrification Program, the REA finances qualified cooperative associations for the purpose of providing generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power to rural residents not receiving central station service. See id.
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If Congress or federal agencies were to establish solar electric utilities for the purpose of competing with existing utilities
for business at the retail level, it is highly likely that these
entities would be subject to PUC jurisdiction in Colorado. The
applicable statute provides that every cooperative electric association and "every other supplier of electricity" are subject
to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the PUC and to
the provisions of the Public Utilities Law.2 9 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that this statute makes no exceptions,
and that every cooperative electric association, as well as every
other supplier of electricity, is a public utility and therefore
subject to PUC jurisdiction. 40 Thus, the certification procedures applicable to privately-owned solar facilities discussed
above would equally be applicable to federally-owned solar
utilities.
The tenth amendment is another potential limitation on
the ability of federally-owned solar utilities to compete with
existing utilities on a retail basis. Under the tenth amendment "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people. '2 In Fry v. United
States, the Supreme Court recognized that under this amendment Congress may not exercise power in a manner that im22
pairs a state's integrity or its ability to function effectively.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, another tenth amendment case, the Supreme Court recognized that the states have
attributes of sovereignty which may not be impaired by Congress..2 3 The Court in Usery held that Congress may not exercise the commerce power so as to limit state decisions regarding
the conduct of integral governmental functions.2 4 After Fry
and Usery it could be argued that a congressionally authorized
solar utility so interferes with the states' regulation of public
utilities, an integral governmental function traditionally of a
239. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 40-1-103(2).
240. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 280, 411 P.2d
785, 794-95, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22, rehearing denied,
3 5 U.S. 984 (1966).
241. U.S. CONST., amend. X.
242. 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
243. 426 U.S. 833, 842, 845 (1976).
244. Id. at 855.
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local nature, that a tenth amendment violation has occurred."2 '
D. Regulated Competition as an Alternative to the Regulated
Monopoly Structure
Competition among regulated solar and nonsolar utilities
is an alternative to the regulated monopoly energy supply market structure. The regulated competition model is currently in
effect in Colorado for transportation utilities as a result of a
1967 amendment to the applicable Colorado certification statute. This law might serve as an example for states that wish
to allow the consumer to choose between solar and fossil fuelgenerated power. Because of this amendment a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to operate a motor vehicle for
hire for the transportation of property no longer constitutes an
exclusive grant or monopoly. Instead, the PUC is authorized to
grant more than one certificate for the transportation of property when it finds that public convenience and necessity require the competing service.
In Miller Bros., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the 1967 amendment eliminated the
requirement that existing service must be shown to be inadequate before a competing carrier may be certified. 27 After
Miller Bros. the new controlling factor is the "public interest."
The Court validated the statute despite the lack of definition
of "regulated competition," and despite the fact that no standards were included under which the PUC might issue additional certificates.2 " This and other cases establish guidelines
that may be used by the PUC in determining whether to issue
a certificate to a common carrier wishing to compete with a
245. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), where state
regulation by the PUC of a privately-owned utility was not considered to be an attribute of state sovereignty.
246. See COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 40-10-105 (1973) which provides in part that:
The granting of any certificate of public convenience and necessity
to operate a motor vehicle for hire for the transportation of property shall
not be deemed to be an exclusive grant or monopoly, and the doctrine of
regulated competition shall prevail. The Commission has authority to
grant more than one certificate of public convenience and necessity to
operate motor vehicles for the transportation of property over the same
route or a part thereof or within the same territory or a part thereof if the
commission finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity requires or will require such operation.
247. 185 Colo. 414, 431-32, 525 P.2d 443, 451-52 (1974).
248. Id. at 430-31, 525 P.2d at 451.
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certified carrier. These guidelines include determinations of
whether (1) there is a public need for the service," 9 (2) the
economic feasibility of existing certified carriers would be

lost, 2 0 (3) there is a need for competition in providing the service, 25 ' (4) the new carrier is willing and able to provide the
service, 252 (5) the competitor's service is unique in any way253

and (6) the competitor's service is better in any way than existing service.5'
Guidelines similar to these could be applied in the event
that existing electric public utilities are required to operate
with solar utilities under a regulated competition model. An
extension of the regulated competition model could promote
the development of solar energy both by existing utilities and
by privately-owned companies desiring to establish solar electric utilities. And under this model a solar utility could compete with an existing utility in providing electric service, but
the PUC could still, through continuing vigilance, assure that
wasteful duplication of facilities and excessive rates do not
occur.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As solar technologies become more workable and marketable, the likelihood of utility involvement in the development of
solar power increases. Such involvement is suspect for many
reasons, the most important of which is the regulated monopoly status of most public utilities. Should such existing public
utilities play a large role in the marketing of SHAC devices,
and should the utility's certificate of convenience and public
necessity foreclose competition by solar utilities, existing utilities will be able to determine the rate, the quality, and the
success of the commercialization of solar technologies. It is
important for law and policy makers to consider the implications of this degree of utility control over the new but growing
solar market. Alternatives to utility involvement in the solar
energy field should be explored, and strategies that limit or at
249. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 545 P.2d 707, 709

(1976).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 709-10.
252. Id. at 710.
253. See Miller Bros., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414, 435, 525 P.2d 443,
453 (1974).
254. Id.
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least regulate utility decisions regarding solar technologies
should be understood. Utilities may be one means of accelerating the speed with which solar energy is accepted by the public.
Nevertheless, the consequences of and alternatives to using
utilities in this manner should be fully examined before utilities assume such a critical role in the solar commercialization
effort.

